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A central task of feminist legal scholars is to deconstruct sys-
tematically, from a feminist perspective, existing law and the insti-
tutions that it creates.' The effort to reveal and to challenge the
male-centered attitudes that structure the law has as its goal the
introduction of women's perspectives and a consequent transfor-
mation of the law.' An underlying premise of some feminist efforts,
including this one, is that such a transformation will not only render
t Copyright 1992 Marion Crain.
* Associate Professor of Law, The University of Toledo. B.S., 1980, Cornell; J.D., 1983,
UCLA. The Fund For Labor Relations Studies and the University of Toledo College of Law
provided research support. Thanks go to Meg Gehrke and D.B. Deck for their able research
assistance, and to Ken Matheny for his insightful critique of an earlier draft.
See Judith Resnik, On the Bias: Feminist Reconsiderations of the Aspirations for Our Judges,
61 S. CAL,. L. REV. 1877, 1906 (1988). "A major shared premise [of feminist work] is that
knowledge of the world is constructed from one's viewpoint and that what has been assumed
(by some) as a universal viewpoint is, in fact, a viewpoint of some men, who have articulated
a vision of reality and claimed it to be true for us all." Id.
See Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms,
42 VAN!). L. Rev. 1183, 1185, 1192 (1989). Katherine Bartlett describes feminist method as
asking "the woman question":
The woman question asks about the gender implications of a social practice or
rule: have women been left out of consideration? If so, in what way; how might
that omission be corrected? What difference would it make to do so? In law,
asking the woman question means examining how the law fails to take into
account the experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of
men, for whatever reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts might
disadvantage women.
Katherine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV, 829, 837 (1990).
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the law more inclusive of the experiences of previously marginalized
groups,3
 but also assure that the law is, in some overriding sense,
fairer. 4
In this article, I undertake a feminist deconstruction of the
labor laws and the activities of the institutions created by them,
labor unions. 3
 Some scholars might question the relevance of such
3
 Abrams, supra note 2, at 1247-48 (feminist task of transforming workplace norms
seeks to teach men to "see beyond a workplace made in their own image, to numerous
inhabitants who are not (male)").
4 See, e.g., Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts On the Liability Crisis, Mass Torts,
Power, and Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848, 888 (applying feminist analysis to mass tort
disputes and suggesting rules or techniques to equalize the parties' power, ultimately increas-
ing the likelihood of just results); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal
Negotiation: The Structure Of Problem-Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 840-41 (1984) (arguing
that following a problem-solving approach in legal negotiations rather than engaging in a
traditional adversarial negotiation process produces a broader array of solutions and, ulti-
mately, more satisfactory resolutions, because the focus of problem solving is on addressing
the underlying real needs of the parties rather than on winning the game; this problem-
solving approach enables parties to negotiate more equitable solutions that meet their long-
and short-term interests and hence produces a greater commitment to abide by the agreement
reached); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia In A Different Voice: Speculations On A Women's
Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39, 52-58 (1985) (observing the connection
between the development of Alternative Dispute Resolution and cooperative forms of ne-
gotiation, and the scholarly development of a feminist perspective, and arguing that im-
porting feminist insights into the law and legal institutions potentially benefits all lawyers).
' The phrase "labor law" refers to the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-
187 (1988). This article builds upon previous work in which I issued a call to feminist scholars
to begin deconstructing the labor laws. See Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging The
tendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1159 (1991). Aside from my own
work, the only legal scholarship that has addressed sex equality arguments in the context of
the labor law (as opposed to employment discrimination or employment law) has been in the
area of pay equity. See, e.g., Paul Weiler, The Wages of Sex: The Uses and Limits of Comparable
Worth, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1728, 1798-1801 (1986) (arguing that comparable worth might be
made a subject of collective bargaining). Most of this work is not explicitly feminist in
orientation or method. See id. Although many feminist legal scholars have written on the
subject of male-centered workplace norms, all have done so in the context of employment
discrimination, and consequently have focused on title Vii or on constitutional law rather
than on the labor laws. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING
WOMEN—A CASE OF SEE DISCRIMINATION 4-6 (1979) (analyzing workplace sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination that reinforces and expresses women's traditional subordinate
role in the work force, and outlining legal arguments for reform under title VII and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Abrams, supra note 2, at 1186
(analyzing sexual harassment and the relationship between career advancement and parent-
ing responsibilities in context of the "primary litigation tool," title VII); Ruth Colker, Anti-
Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1004-08
(1986) (comparing and contrasting the efficacy of principles of anti-subordination and anti-
differentiation in affirmative action cases under the Equal Protection Clause); Lucinda M.
Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the Workplace Debate, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1122-42 (1986) (examining treatment of maternity issues in the
workplace under title V11); Mary Joe Frug, Securing Job Equality for Women: Labor Market
Hostility to Working Mothers, 59 B.U. L. REV. 55, 58-61 (1979) (analyzing title VII and equal
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an inquiry, in view of the rapidly dwindling share of the work force
represented by labor unions. 6 1 have argued elsewhere that unions
protection doctrine for strategies to challenge employment policies . that burden working
mothers); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955, 1002,
1008-13 (1984) (proposing strict constitutional analysis of sex-based laws and laws governing
reproductive issues in the workplace where laws operate to perpetuate sex inequality); Vicki
Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the
Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the Lack of Interest Argument, l03 FIARV. L. REV. 1749, 1754-
69 (1990) (examining judicial treatment under title VII of phenomenon of sex segregation
in occupations); Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797, 800-02 (1989)
(challenging relational feminists' theory and description of gender differences, showing how
employers have turned relational feminist theory against women under title VII, and pro-
posing gender neutral reforms designed to alter the existing vision of the ideal worker, which
is constructed around male norms, while simultaneously refusing to institutionalize a corre-
lation between gender roles and biological sex differences).
It is possible that the dearth of feminist legal scholarship in this area is attributable
primarily to the paucity of female labor law professors. Women are also underrepresented
on industrial relations faculties. See Lois S. Gray, Professional Careers for Women in Industrial
Relations, in WORKING WOMEN: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE 225, 239 (Karen Shallcross Koziaria
et al. eds., 1987),(only 12% of members of Industrial Relations Research Association involved
in research, teaching or administration in industrial relations were women). In fields where
women are more commonly found teaching, such as sociology, much has been written on
the subject of the relationship between feminism and labor unions. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1990, at 389, Table No. 645 (47.6 %
of all social scientists and urban planners are women, but only 19.3 % of lawyers are women);
See, e.g., DIANE BALSER, SISTERHOOD AND SOLIDARITY: FEMINISM AND LABOR IN MODERN TIMES
(1987); LINDA M. BLUM, BETWEEN FEMINISM AND LABOR: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMPA-
RABLE WORTH MOVEMENT (1991); ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, OUT To WORK (1982); RUTH
MILKMAN, GENDER AT WORK: THE DYNAMICS OF JOB SEGREGATION BY SEX DURING WORLD
WAR 11 (1987).
Nevertheless, the failure of feminist legal scholars to concentrate on a body of law
primarily affecting the rights of working class women, and their tendency to prefer to engage
in analyses of workplace norms that primarily affect middle- and upper-class professionals
and semi-professional women (usually white women), raises the familiar specter of essential-
ism in feminist theory. See BLUM, supra, at 15 (mainstream feminist movement has overlooked
centrality of class in determining women's experiences); BELL HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY:
FROM MARGIN To CENTER 34-35 (1984) (failure to emphasize necessity for mass-based
feminist movement addressing concerns of poor women and women of color helped mar-
ginalize feminism; a fundamental change in strategy and focus of feminist movement is
required if it is to realize its transformative potential); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism
in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.REV. 581, 585 (1990) (arguing that the work of feminists
Catharine MacKinnon and Robin West relics on gender essentialism, "the notion that a
unitary, 'essential' women's experience can be isolated and described independently of race,
class, sexual orientation, and other realities of experience"). See generally ELIZABETH SPELMAN,
THE INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1988) (examining
essentialism in feminist theory).
° Union density has declined dramatically over the last four decades: between 1953 and
1989, density in the private sector fell from 35 percent to 12 percent. Robert J. LaLonde &
Bernard D. Meltzer, Hard Times For Unions: Another Look At the Significance of Employer Ille-
galities, 58 U. Ctn. L. REV. 953, 953 (1991). In 1991, private sector union density stood at
11.9%. Union Membership Unchanged At 16.1 Percent of Employment in 1991, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 28, at B—I (Feb. 11, 1992). This figure is projected to drop below 10 percent by
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should be relevant, particularly to the women's movement, because
they are properly situated to effect significant economic, political
and social advances for working women.' Moreover, even if unions
themselves are irrelevant, the issues raised by their decline are not. 8
The labor laws that have shaped the course of union representation
for workers are modeled on the larger political structure of repre-
sentative democracy, serving as a "charter of industrial democracy"
for workers.° Consequently, "labor law as a representative democ-
racy promises the same rewards and confronts the same problems
as its parent and archetype, liberal democracy.',10
Although a few scholars" and labor leaders" have advocated
the abolition of labor law, the vast majority remain committed to
the philosophy and structure of labor law in the United States, and
advocate its reform and transformation, rather than its abolition.'s
the year 2000. Paul Weiler, Hard Times For Unions: Challenging Times For Scholars, 58 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1015, 1017 (1991).
See Crain, supra note 5, at 1156.
" CHARLES HECESCHER, THE NEW UNIONISM: EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT IN THE CHANGING
CORPORATION 12 (1988).
9 See Steven L. Willborn, Industrial Democracy and the National Labor Relations Act: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 25 B.C. L. Ray. 725, 725 (1984).
IS Id.
" See Richard A. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal
Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J. 1357, 1357 (1983) (proposing that "a sensible common law
regime relying heavily upon tort and contract law" should replace the NLRA) [hereinafter
Epstein, A Common Law For Labor Relations]; Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At
Will, 51 U. Cm. L. REV. 947, 982 (1984) [hereinafter Epstein, Contract at Will] (championing
the adequacy of protection afforded individual employees by idealized, freely functioning
labor market); see also Charles Fried, Individual and Collective Rights in Work Relations: Reflections
on the Current State of Labor Law and its Prospects, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1012, 1019 (1984)
(advocating reconsideration of the premise that the best protection of worker interests is
accomplished through restructuring of the market, with guaranteed access to the process of
bargaining in which the strength of workers' position is assured through the monopolistic
principle of exclusive representation; Fried proposes direct imposition of minimal standards
and removal of the governmentally sheltered status of labor unions); Richard A. Posner,
Some Economics of Labor Law, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 988, 999-1002 (1984) (labor law and
unionization function to cartelize the labor supply at the expense of productivity, competition,
consumer welfare and the remainder of the labor market).
12 See Richard L. Trumka, Why Labor Law Has Failed, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 871, 871, 877
(1987) (United Mineworkers president advocates repeal of labor law; unions should wage
battles in state courts and in political arenas); Kirkland Says Many Unions Avoiding NLRB, 132
Lab. Rel. Rep. (BN A) 13 (Sept. 4, 1989) (AFL-CIO president Lane Kirkland would prefer
no labor law because current law "forbids us to show solidarity and direct union support").
19
 Most propose incremental reforms. See, e.g., PAUL WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORK-
PLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 185 (1990) [hereinafter WEILER, GOV-
ERNING THE WORKPLACE] (proposing reforms designed to realign the balance of power in
the union organization phase and to expand protection for union economic weapons);
Charles 13. Craver, The Vitality of the American Labor Movement in the Twenty-First Century, 1983
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I join the chorus of voices defending the philosophy of American
labor law, but for a fundamentally different reason." I argue that
U. ILL. L. REV. 633, 635-36 (1983) (arguing that unions must organize white-collar workers
and those who work with new technology, and include these highly educated workers in
expanded participatory management schemes, as well as attend to the need to adapt to a
global economy); David L. Gregory, Proposals to Harmonize Labor Law Jurisprudence and to
Reconcile Political Tensions, 65 NEB. L. REV. 75, 82-84 (1986) (advocating the formation of a
federal Labor Court of Appeals to hear all NLRB cases in order to coordinate and centralize
NLRB jurisprudence and end inter-circuit conflicts); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Reg-
ulation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 631, 658-62 (1985)
(arguing that state and local government workers should be governed by a national employ-
ment law and that employee participation in workplace management should be mandatory);
Clyde Summers, Past Premises, Present Failures, and Future Needs in Labor Legislation, 31 Burr.
L. REv, 9, 19 (1982) (suggesting that the use of collective bargaining should be expanded
and encouraged and, in the absence of a union, alternative forms of worker representation
should be implemented); Paul Weiler, Promises To Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-Orga-
nization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769, 1805 (1983) [hereinafter Weiler, Promises
To Keep] (proposing union certification on basis of signed authorization cards rather than
after prolonged organizing campaign and election); Paul Weiler, Striking A New Balance:
Freedom of Contract and the Prospects for Union Representation, 98 HARV. L. REV. 351, 404-19
(1984) [hereinafter Weiler, Striking a New Balance] (suggesting recourse to compulsory arbi-
tration of deadlocks in first union contracts, reversal of rule allowing permanent replacement
of strikers, loosening of secondary boycott restrictions, and increased union power to disci-
pline members).
Others, especially Critical Legal Studies scholars, Focus on the original radical potential
of the Wagner Act, and argue that judicial interpretation of the Act has undermined it;
accordingly, transformative, re-radicalizing efforts are required. See, e.g., JAmEs B. ATLESON,
VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 143-60, 171-80 (1983); Karl E. Klare,
Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-
41, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 270, 336-39 (1978) [hereinafter Klare, Judicial Deradicalization];
Karl E. Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward A New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law,
4 It‘mus. REL. L.J. 450, 459, 465, 481-82 (1981) [hereinafter Kiare, Labor Law as Ideology];
Karl E. Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction: An Agenda For Legal Reform, 38
CATE/. U. L. REV. 1, 5, 16-17 (1988) [hereinafter Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market
Reconstruction]. See generally Peter E. Millspaugh, America's Industrial Relations Experiment: Legal
Scholarship Assesses the Wagner Act, 32 ST. Louts U. L.J. 673, 673-74, 711 (1988) (summarizing
critiques of labor law and proposals for its reform advanced in the last decade).
The commitment of these scholars is especially clear with regard to the following attri-
butes of labor law created by the Wagner Act: an individual rights-based system of protection
for employees; an adversarial structure with a balance of power between capital and labor
as the goal; industrial democracy, with unions serving as the voice of employees; and collective
bargaining in the individual workplace. But see HECKSCHER, supra note 8, at 254-56 (arguing
for evolution of unionism toward "associational unionism," a new, more flexible form of
unionism for which it is necessary to "turn the Wagner Act upside down").
14 I share with some of the scholars cited at note 13, supra, a focus on increasing employee
empowerment through participation in the process of workplace governance, rather than
through the safeguarding of individual entitlements, or rights. See Klare, Judicial Deradicali-
zation, supra note 13, at 336-39; Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 13, at 481-82; see
also Cass R. Sunstein, Rights, Minimal Terms, and Solidarity: A Comment, 51 U. Cut. L. REV.
1041, 1058-59 (1984) (significance of Wagner Act is that it creates a right to a process of
workplace decisionmaking; goal is to generate employee participation). I identify that com-
mitment to ensuring voice, rather than ensuring rights, as more consistent with a commu-
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the Wagner Act was a jurisprudentially unique attempt to construct
a system of representative government to institutionalize the dy-
namics of a communitarian social order, the labor movement.I 5 Both
the communitarianism typified by the early labor movement and
modern relational feminism envision an individual's fulfillment as
achieved through connection and community, rather than through
separation and autonomy. 16 Moreover, collective action is consistent .
with a radical feminist theory of economic and political empower-
ment.' 7 Thus, the Wagner Act is consistent in its basic philosophy
with women's values and experience, and offers an effective route
to collective empowerment for working women.
Unlike the system of individual rights created by liberal legal
theory as a check on government power, the effort by labor law to
protect group rights and to codify the experience of direct self-
government is fundamentally compatible with feminist method and
theory. The Wagner Act was intended to advance the larger political
democracy by empowering workers and by promoting industrial
nitarian system of power allocation in the workplace than it is with the existing republican/
liberal focus on individual rights, increasingly reflected in labor law jurisprudence and
scholarship. See infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text for a discussion of the republican/
liberal system of power allocation.
n The Wagner Act was the original piece of federal labor legislation that established
the federally protected status of unions; encouraged employees to organize collectively to
counterbalance the economic power of employers; granted statutory protection for concerted
employee activity, including the right to strike; and prescribed a legal framework favoring
collective bargaining between unions and employers. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act,
Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-187
(1988)). The Wagner Act and its subsequent amendments, see The Labor-Management
Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. f§ 141-197 (1988)), and The Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519 (1959) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153-187 (1988)), are collectively referred to as the National
Labor Relations Act, and are codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1988).
16 Compare Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 32 (1989) (communitarian conception of the common
good emphasizes the importance of participating as a group member to process of self-
realization) with CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE 148 (1982) (describing decision-
making, in a context where interests conflict, from a cultural feminist perspective, as "the
process of making decisions with care, on the basis of what you know, and taking responsibility
for choice while seeing the possible legitimacy of other solutions") and Robin West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. I, 14, 17 (1988) (feminist works focus on connection
and relationships, rather than on separation and autonomy, as the fundamental difference
between (respectively) female and male perspectives),
" See Jeanne L. Schroeder, Abduction From the Seraglio: Feminist Methodologies and the Logic
of Imagination, 70 TEX. L. REv. 109, 195 & n.272 (1991) (describing radical feminists, partic-
ularly MacKinnon, as supporting collective action by women because it is an effective political
strategy for empowerment).
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democracy in the workplace." These goals rested upon the as-
sumption that the union's ability to influence decisionmaking in the
workplace would emanate from its power as the employees' majority
representative to speak on behalf of its members. The union's
power, then, derived from the community of workers, and its
strength rested directly on the bonds between community mem-
bers.' 9 Union power was effectuated through protection of the col-
lective right to "engage in concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection," a "translation into law of the labor movement concept
of 'solidarity. ,7,20
Nevertheless, the Wagner Act is also riddled with patriarchal
assumptions about power and its allocation that are fundamentally
incompatible with feminist method and theory. The primary goal
of the Wagner Act was to create ("restore") a "balance of power"
between capital and labor in order to ensure industrial peace. 21 This
goal rested on an image of management-labor relations as inher-
ently adversarial, necessarily entailing a struggle for power that
could only be resolved when one succeeded in dominating and
controlling the other. Because the employer's role as the senior
"partner" in the relationship with labor was assumed, labor's role
as the junior subordinate "partner" was inevitable. 22 Such a concept
of power relations, which I have defined elsewhere as "patriar-
'° See ATLESON, supra note 13, at 41; Willborn, supra note 9, at 725.
19 As Staughton Lynd put it, because union members perceived that "'an injury to one
is an injury to all," they were willing to place their own jobs in jeopardy to protect another
member's rights. Staughton Lynd, Government Without Rights: The Labor Law Vision of Archibald
Cox, 1981 INDUS. REL. L.J. 483, 494.
2° See National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1988); Lynd, supra note 19,
at 494.
Si National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.G. § 151 (1988). Section one provides:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees . . . and employers ..
substantially burdens and affects the flow of commerce . . . . Experience has
proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain
collectively safeguards commerce from injury . . . by removing certain recog-
nized sources of industrial strife and unrest . • . and by restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.
Id.; see also SELIG PERLMAN, A HISTORY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN TliE UNITED STATES 279 (1923)
("[T]he social order which the typical American trade unionist considers ideal is one in which
organized labor and organized capital possess equal bargaining power.").
22 First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) ("Congress had no
expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the
running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are employed."); see also
PERLMAN, supra note 21, at 279 (noting that the American trade unionist, while desiring an
equal voice with the employer in fixing wages and working conditions, did not aspire to the
task of "running industry without the employer").
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 is inconsistent with a feminist understanding of power. Fem-
inist power is conceived of as a relation between people; it is based
in community and is exercised as energy, ability or capacity, rather
than through domination and control of another."
The purpose of this article is to expose how these contradictory
underlying assumptions about power cause tension between labor
law's twin goals of industrial democracy and industrial peace, to
show how these assumptions are reflected in the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA") and its jurisprudence, and to suggest how
the NLRA might be altered to become a more significant tool in a
feminist agenda challenging the economic, political and social dis-
empowerment of working women. Today, the predominant image
of power reflected in the NLRA and perpetuated in labor law
jurisprudence is the patriarchal vision of power as domination and
control. Such a limited understanding of power affects the way
power is exercised as well as who exercises it. 25 Ultimately, it ensures
that worker solidarity and power is never truly realized, and that
capital retains control. 26
In this article, I describe the patriarchal vision of power (dom-
ination and control) that pervades labor law, examine how it affects
labor law jurisprudence, and inquire how the law might differ if
the alternative image of power (community-centered), which is also
present in the NLRA, assumed preeminence. I argue that a corn-
" See Marion Crain, Feminism, Labor, and Power, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming May
1992) (manuscript at 12-13, on file with the BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW) (patriarchal
definition of power revolves around a hierarchical paradigm in which one dominates and
another submits, one controls and another is controlled; because it is founded on a material
base and controls the dispersion of the fruits of capitalism in a sexist hierarchy where women
occupy the bottom rungs, its exercise ultimately oppresses women). It is not surprising to
find a patriarchal understanding of power reflected in law, since the essence of law itself is
patriarchal: "The whole structure of law—its hierarchical organization; its combative, adver-
sarial format; and its undeviating bias in favor of rationality over all other values—defines it
as a fundamentally patriarchal institution." Diane Polan, Toward A Theory of Law and Patriarchy,
in THE POLITICS OF LAw: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 294, 301 (David Kairys ed., 1982); see also
Janet Rifkin, Mediation From A Feminist Perspective: Promises and Problems, in 2 LAw & INEQUAL-
ITY: A JOURNAL OF THEORY AND PRAcricE 21, 22 (1984) (patriarchal paradigm of law is
hierarchy, combat and adversarialism).
" Crain, supra note 23, at 55-56.
22 See Jane S. Jaquette, Power As Ideology: A Feminist Analysis, in WOMEN'S VIEWS OF THE
POLITICAL WORLD OF MEN 9, 10-11 ( Judith W. Steihm ed., 1984).
26 Our continued reliance on an adversarial paradigm of labor law serves as an effective
barrier to transforming the law. See William B. Gould IV, Reflections on Workers' Participation,
Influence, and Powersharing: The Future of Industrial Relations, 58 U. Cm. L. REV. 381, 383
(1989) ("A major obstacle in reshaping relationships in this country . . . has been our
adherence to traditional adversarial attitudes, and the fact that labor law has based its
assumptions upon the model of conflict.").
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munitarian-based theory of power allocation is more likely to pro-
duce worker empowerment, particularly for women workers, than
the predominant liberal/republican paradigm of power allocation.
Section 1 describes the patriarchal ideology of power that shapes
our adversarial system, and more particularly, the republican system
of power allocation reflected in our labor laws and jurisprudence. 27
Section II articulates a feminist theory of power, assesses its com-
patibility with communitarian theory, and examines its foundations
in Wagner Act jurisprudence. 28 Section I I I analyzes other proposals
for labor law reform that call for reconsideration of its adversarial
nature, and contrasts those proposals with the feminist/communi-
tarian perspective described in Section 11. 29 Section IV sets forth a
blueprint for a labor law jurisprudence that would reflect this al-
ternative conception of power anctfurther worker participation and
empowerment. 3°
I. PATRIARCHAL IMAGES OF POWER IN LABOR LAW
The law both articulates and reflects patriarchy: "it is both real
and ideal; it both constructs reality and mirrors it; it is both deter-
mined and determining." 31 Zillah Eisenstein argues that, because
the law controls the dynamics of patriarchy and so helps to maintain
the status quo, the law is a proper target for feminists who seek to
change patriarchy." With that end in mind, I turn to a deconstruc-
tion of the patriarchal images of power that are embedded in the
structure of labor law.
A. The Patriarchal Conception of Power
Political theorists and sociologists, assuming that conflict of in-
terests and goals is inevitable in a materialistic society possessing
scarce resources, have equated power with domination, control and
" See infra notes 31-146 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 147-222 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 223-40 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 241-76 and accompanying text.
81 ZILLAH R. EISENSTEIN, FEMINISM AND SEXUAL EQUALITY: CRISIS IN LIBERAL AMERICA
97 (1984).
32 Id. Although Eisenstein concedes that challenges to the law are alone insufficient to
dethrone patriarchy in society, she argues that struggles within the law are an essential part
of the process of challenging patriarchal privilege because changing the law changes patriar-
chy as it presently exists. Id. at 100.
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coercion." Often conceptualized as "power over" others because of
its relative nature, such power usually is dispersed through and
exercised within a hierarchical, competitive system.34 The key to
power in a materialistic society is the possession of or access to
scarce resources. 35 Ultimately, because power brings increased ac-
cess to resources, power itself becomes a scarce resource, 36
Feminist theory posits that an understanding of power as dom-
ination, control and coercion is patriarchal because it is materially
based and is exercised within a hierarchical paradigm in which one
person or group dominates and another submits. 37 This vision of
power is predicated on the following assumptions:
that there exists a fixed quantity of resources that all desire
equally, creating an inherent conflict of interest which is
exacerbated by existing power differentials; that resources
are distributed according to a hierarchical power struc-
ture; that one's position in the hierarchy is achieved
through competition characterized by overt conflict; that
such competition takes the form of dominating those less
powerful than oneself; and that the desire to dominate is
natural, inevitable, and is sex itself. 38
The patriarchal definition of power has shaped law generally, par-
ticularly its adversarial character. 39 Patriarchal notions about power
33 See Crain, supra note 23, at 17; see also NANCY C.M. HARTSOCK, MONEY, SEX AND
POWER: TOWARD A FEMINIST HISTORICAL MATERIALISM 2 (1983) (summarizing Bertrand
Russell's view of power as "the ability to compel obedience"); STEVEN LUXES, POWER: A
RADICAL VIEW 23-24 (1974) (most insidious exercise of power is to influence and shape
people's perceptions so that "they accept their role in the existing order," thus preventing
conflict from arising in the first instance); DENNIS H. WRONG, POWER: ITS FORMS, BASES AND
USES 23-35 (1979) (power takes one of four distinct forms: force, manipulation, persuasion
and authority); Talcott Parsons, On The Concept of Political Power, in POLITICAL POWER: A
READER IN THEORY AND RESEARCH 251,256 (Roderick Bell et al. eds., 1969) (power is defined
as "the generalized capacity to secure the performance of binding obligations").
54 See STEWART CLEGG, THE THEORY OF POWER AND ORGANIZATION 65-67 (1979) (dis-
cussing work of theorists who conclude that power distribution is "zero-sum" and therefore
necessarily entails competition and,conflict); MARILYN FRENCH, BEYOND POWER: ON WOMEN,
MEN AND MORALS 506-07 (1985) (noting propriety of the "power over" label).
35 Crain, supra note 23, at 14.
" See Anthony Giddens, Power in the Recent Writings of Takott Parsons, 2 SOCIOLOGY 257,
264-65 (1968). In more colloquial terms, "the rich get richer."
37 Such a paradigm is patriarchal even when it exists between and among men. Heidi
Hartmann, Capitalism, Patriarchy, and Job Segregation By Sex, in CAPITALIST PATRIARCHY AND
THE CASE FOR SOCIALIST FEMINISM 206,232 n.1 (Zillah R. Eisenstein ed., 1979).
38 Crain, supra note 23, at 17.
39 Labor law provides a particularly clear illustration of the adversarial nature of law.
See infra notes 120-46 and accompanying text.
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also have been instrumental, however, in structuring systems of
power allocation and management, otherwise known as political
theory. Because an understanding of the political model for labor
law is essential to the illumination of the role of power in framing
adversarial labor law, I address the political model of labor law first.
B. The Republican Model of Power Dispersion
Labor law has been justified and legitimated through an anal-
ogy to the larger political democracy. The National Labor Relations
Act functions as the constitution in this "mini-democracy," provid-
ing the organizational structure and ensuring basic individual rights
for workers.° Under its auspices and the watchful eye of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), workers elect unions to
represent them in the "legislative process" of collective bargaining."
The labor agreement, once negotiated, becomes the industrial code
applicable to the particular workplace. 42 Private arbitrators serve as
the judiciary to resolve disputes arising under the labor agree-
ment.43 In short, the NLRA was modeled after a republican system
of government, with power dispersed through a representative de-
mocracy."
1. Republican Systems of Power Allocation in the Larger Political
Context
Republicanism, by which I mean the political theory of power
dispersion and management on which our political structure is
based, is currently undergoing a "revival" among legal scholars and
political theorists.45 This revival has brought to light new insights
4° Willborn, supra note 9, at 729.
41 Id. at 728-29.
42 See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S 574,578
(1960) ("The collective bargaining agreement ... is more than a contract; it is a generalized
code to govern a myriad of cases which the draftsmen cannot wholly anticipate,"); J.I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332,334-35 (1944) ("Collective bargaining ... negotiations between
union and management result in what often has been called a trade agreement, rather than
in a contract of employment.").
" Willborn, supra note 9, at 728.
44 Id. at 731.
'" The theory is so trendy that the Yale Law Journal recently devoted an entire issue to
a symposium on republicanism and its revival. See Frank Micheiman, Lath Republic, 97 YALE
L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
See also the comments following the principal articles, at 97 YALE L.J. 1591-1723. The
dialogue has occupied some of the most "provocative and insightful constitutional land other]
scholars." See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What Is Republicanism, and is ii Worth Reviving?, 102
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about the advantages and disadvantages of republicanism for op-
pressed groups within the citizenry. Republicanism is a philosoph-
ical doctrine concerning the distribution of power among the citi-
zenry and in politics. This doctrine is associated with the work of
Pocock and Shalhope.46 There exists no unitary conception of pol-
itics that can be described as republican.'" The underlying assump-
tion of all republican theory, however, is that freedom can be best
attained through participation in a community, wherein citizens
place the public good above their individual interests. 48 By contrast,
liberalism seeks freedom through negative means, and assumes that
true freedom inheres only in autonomy, or the right to be let alone.49
Scholars have identified two distinct forms of republicanism,
classical republicanism and Madisonian republicanism. Classical re-
publicanism focuses on the deliberative process of politics as the
means of freedom for a participating citizenry. 5° Decisionmaking
under classical republicanism occurs through a process of dialogue
HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1695 (1989). Most of the scholars who have engaged in this debate have
contrasted republicanism (sometimes erroneously confused with communitarianism because
of the centrality of the republican value of civic virtue, or the good of the community) with
liberalism, and its focus on individual rights. Because individual rights are "conflict notions,"
they arguably have no place in an intimate or harmonious community; indeed, recognizing
individual rights may actually have a deleterious effect on the commitment of individuals to
the community. See Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adju-
dication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 544 (1986) (feminine jurisprudence might embrace and adapt
"communitarian and virtue-based framework of Jeffersonian republicanism"); Cynthia V.
Ward, The Limits of Liberal Republicanism"; Why Group-Based Remedies and Republican Citizenship
Don't Mix, 91 CoLont. L. REV. 581, 583 (1991) (republican revivalists draw upon "communi-
tarian aspirations for public-spirited citizenship"); see also John Tomasi, Individual Rights and
Community Virtues, 101 ETHICS 521, 521-22 (1991) (articulating the tension between rights
and community, but concluding that individual rights are compatible with the virtues of
community); cf. James G. Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the
American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 296 (1990) (emphasizing "political
design features" of republicanism rather than its ethical foundations, and therefore contrast-
ing republicanism with interest group pluralism rather than liberalism in the abstract).
46 See Fallon, supra note 45, at 1696 n.9 (attribution of theory); see also Michael A. Fitts,
Look Before You Leap: Some Cautionary Notes on Civic Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1651, 1655
(1988) ("result (if not goal) of republican approach is dispersion of power within the political
process").
47 Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1547; Ward, supra note 45, at 584.
" See Pope, supra note 45, at 296-97. The "allure" of republicanism lies in its hope of
a "'constitutive' community." Fallon, supra note 45, at 1721 (quoting MICHAEL J. SANDEL,
LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 150-51 (1982)). Such a community is one in which
there exists "a deep and ongoing political dialogue through which we open ourselves to
others, shape and are shaped by others, and experience an enriching and ennobling inte-
gration of self and community." Id.
49 Pope, supra note 45, at 296.
Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1547-48.
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in politics conducted by citizens who participate as equals, in pursuit
of a common good.5 ' "Civic virtue" is a "central organizing feature"
of classical republicanism. 52 The assumption is that every citizen is
virtuous, or has the potential to be so, and hence will strive toward
realization of the common good. Indeed, participation in politics is
assumed to be self-actualizing for the citizenry."
Madisonian republicanism, by contrast, envisions participation
through the deliberation of virtuous representatives elected by the
people, but far enough removed from them to avoid the tyrannies
of faction and corruption. 54 Madison eschewed direct citizen partic-
ipation in the processes of government, believing that national rep-
resentatives of the populace, "operating above the fray," would
possess the virtue necessary to further an "objective" conception of
the public good. 55 Representatives were made accountable to the
polity through the imposition of political checks, including electoral
supervision and other safeguards. 56 Republican revivalists have
tended to focus on Madisonian republicanism rather than on clas-
sical republicanism. 57
Cass Sunstein describes four attributes of republicanism that
give it a "contemporary appeal." First, republicanism offers an op-
portunity for deliberation in government. Such deliberation would
allow existing desires to be revised according to collective discussion,
in light of alternative perspectives and additional information that
may arise. Republicanism uses deliberation to arrive at a decision
that will best serve the community in general, based on notions of
civic virtue. 58 Second, republicanism requires political equality; that
is, all individuals and groups must be afforded access to the political
process.59 Third, republicanism seeks universality of norms, or
31 Michelman, supra note 45, at 1503.
32 MARK TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 10 (1988) (in its classical form, republican theory mandates participation among virtuous
citizens "who draw their understandings of themselves and the meaning of their lives from
their participation with others in a social world that they actively and jointly create"); Sunstein,
supra note 45, at 1548.
53 See Michelman, supra note 45, at 1503. Hannah Arendt argues that the Aristotelian
pursuit of civic action is good for the soul. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 7—
8,10,175-81 (1958); HANNAH ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 15 (1963).
54 Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29,38-48
(1985).
55 Id. at 42.
56 Id. at 46-47,85.
57 See, e.g., id. at 30.
55 Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1549-50.
59 Id. at 1552. For some, but not all, republican theorists, the commitment to political
equality also includes a commitment to economic equality. Id. at 1552-53.
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agreement as a regulative ideal. Rather than suggesting that there
exists a common understanding of a unitary public good, Sunstein
argues that universality refers to a belief in the process of mediating
differing views of the public good through dialogue." The final
attribute is the significance of citizenship, specifically the right to
participate in the political process, with the purpose of monitoring
the behavior of representatives. Small, decentralized republican sys-
tems have been considered most likely to be true to the deliberative
process.6 ' Although Sunstein's vision of the deliberative process is
representative, and therefore Madisonian in nature, he advocates
direct participation of the citizenry at the local leve1. 62
Sunstein notes that a serious shortcoming of republicanism is
its historical strategy of exclusion of the non-propertied—women,
Blacks and other minorities; he notes that the common good was
defined in relation to these practices of exclusion. 63 The assumption
that a unitary common good exists ignores the needs and interests
of those who, because of their disempowerment, do not participate
at any level in defining the public good." Classical republicanism is
especially hostile toward women; it "is militaristic, . . . associating
political behavior with warfare, and valuing in politics the charac-
teristics prized during times of battle." 65 Moreover, classical repub-
licanism is consistent with the existence of rigid social hierarchies,
and emphasizes the role of tradition in according status within
them.66 Finally, it is a highly rationalistic political theory, emphasiz-
ing deliberation as a means of transcending the affective side of
humanity, and devaluing the private sphere as part of "nature." 67
Nevertheless, Sunstein defends a form of liberal republicanism
with a new twist. He argues that the principles of this liberal re-
publicanism provide the basis for reform that could support a the-
ory of social subordination reinforcing constitutional protections
against discrimination." He proposes proportional representation
66
 Id. at 1554-55.
61 Id. at 1555-56.
62 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429
(1987).
Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1539.
64 Id. at 1540.
65 Id. at 1564.
66
 Id. at 1565.
67 Id.
" Id. at 1580-81. This is apparently an oblique reference to the work of feminist legal
scholars, in particular Catharine MacKinnon, who have constructed equality arguments—
under the Constitution and title V11—on a theory of social and economic subordination. See
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in government of disadvantaged groups in order to remedy the
problem of access to the deliberative process. 69
Sunstein's defense of modified republicanism is incomplete,
however, particularly on the question of the fate of the rights of
oppressed groups under the "new republicanist" tradition. Repub-
licanism's search for a "common good" assumes a moral consensus
on values, and ignores the fact that republicanism is by nature
hostile to those whose voices threaten disruption of its normative
unity. In an incisive critique, Derrick Bell and Preeta Bansal note
that the emphasis on reasoned deliberation, with its aura of pas-
sionless objectivity, is distinctly male and distinctly white." They
point out that the backdrop of "shared values" against which deci-
sions concerning the public good have been made include a belief
in the propriety or naturalness of the inferior, subordinate position
that Black Americans have occupied relative to whites."
Kathleen Sullivan dubs the Sunstein version of republicanism
(shared in its significant respects by Frank Michelman) "rainbow
republicanism," to capture the idea that the heterogeneity of the
modern populace and its variety of perspectives could be a virtue
of republicanism, rather than a vice. 72 Sullivan eschews rainbow
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 40-41 (1987) (arguing that an equality
question is a question of power and its distribution; thus, sex equality issues are raised by
the socially situated subordination of women accomplished through women's assignment to
low-paying sex-segregated work, the high incidence of sexual violence directed against
women, including rape, sexual assault, domestic violence, and sexual harassment, and the
continued growth of industries trafficking in female flesh, including prostitution and por-
nography); see also Colker, supra note 5, at 1007-16; Robin West, Equality Theory, Marital Rape,
and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 Fla. L. Rev. 45, 59-61 (1990) (summarizing
arguments of feminist anti-subordinationists, notably Catharine MacKinnon, Mary Becker
and Ruth Colker, that the social subordination of women by men is the target of the Equal
Protection Clause, and substantive equality its goal).
09 Id, at 1588.
70 See Derrick Bell & Preeta Bansal, The Republican Revival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE
L.J. 1609,1610 & n.4 (1988) (citing feminist critiques by Carol Gilligan, Catharine MacKinnon
and Suzanna Sherry).
" Id. at 1611. This "common good" sanctioned slavery for centuries, and continues to
promote racial domination through a consensus ideology that, while promising non-discrim-
inatinn, reinforces the racial disadvantages of our blatantly racist past. See id.; see also Ward,
supra note 45, at 604-05. Ward argues that proportional representation of disadvantaged
groups in governmental bodies is incompatible with republicanism. Id. She argues that such
group representation accepts the notion that the political interests of racial and ethnic
minorities are "irreducibly opposed" to those of the white (male) majority, and that only
members of those disadvantaged groups can represent the groups' interests in government.
Id. In contrast, Ward notes that republicanism's goal is "dialogic empathy between equal
citizens" working together toward some common good; thus, group representation is "com-
muno-pathic." Id.
72 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Rainbow Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1713, 1713-14 (1988).
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republicanism because of its focus on immutable differences—sex,
race, physical disability, sexual orientation—and its consequent ten-
dency to institutionalize involuntary group cleavages in politics."
The historian Linda Kerber points out that the exclusion of op-
pressed, non-propertied groups was "essential to the republican view
of the world, not an easily correctable accident." 74 Thus, despite the
efforts of republican revivalists to offer up a republican theory
shorn of its exclusionary aspects, the relationship between the pol-
itics of patriarchy and republican tradition is too complex and too
intertwined to be so easily dismissed. 75 As Kerber explains, both
patriarchy and the institution of slavery (or racial subordination)
reinforce republicanism: "the [male] head of the family represents
the family [and its servants and slaves] in its relationship to the
state."76
Richard Epstein reinforces these critiques in his argument that
republican theory, though portrayed by Michelman and Sunstein
as procedural, actually assumes certain substantive norms and val-
ues. 77 For example, Epstein argues that Sunstein assumes that "cor-
rect" deliberation on anti-discrimination legislation will show the
value of government regulation." Epstein contends that because
serious deliberation might actually yield the opposite result, a pos-
sibility that Sunstein ignores, Sunstein's theory is actually substan-
tive, rather than solely procedural. Yet Sunstein makes no explicit
defense of his theory's substantive assumptions, that is, that race
and gender discrimination are evils that should be addressed
through the political process. 79 In other words, Sunstein assumes
that a definition of the public good will be conducted by reference
to shared social norms that are liberal in character, rather than
market-oriented.
In short, exclusion of subordinated groups is itself a shared
social norm, although it is rarely acknowledged. The social reality
is that subordinated groups do not possess, and have not possessed,
73 Id. at 1716. Sullivan proposes a philosophy of normative pluralism that would avoid
any quest for agreement upon a single common good and would instead emphasize voluntary
group affiliations, independent of the state, as the relevant centers of value formation and
social interaction. Id. at 1714.
" Linda K. Kerber, Making Republicanism Useful, 97 YALE L.J. 1663, 1665 (1988).
75 See id. at 1668.
76 Id.
77 See Richard A. Epstein, Modern Republicanism—Or the Flight from Substance, 97 YALE
L.J. 1633, 1639-43 (1988).
78 Id. at 1646.
79 Id.
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an equal right of access to the community of participation and
deliberation. 80 Their exclusion from access begins in patriarchal
institutions such as the family, is reinforced by a hierarchically
structured workplace featuring white men in positions of power—
with women, Blacks and other subordinated groups in servile
roles81—and is continued by republican political theory reinforcing
the isolation of the populace from their representatives (who, of
course, are predominantly white males). The federal legislative pro-
cess, distant as it is from the daily experience of most citizens, is
unlikely to alleviate this exclusion. 82 Indeed, Madisonian republi-
canism has historically emphasized the insulation of representatives
from the populace, in order to protect representatives from public
pressure and to foster deliberation rather than an "unreflective
representation of popular will." 88
The inherent elitism in republican theory makes republicanism
an unlikely vehicle for eliminating the subordination of oppressed
groups. As James Pope has argued, the initial Michelman/Sunstein
approach of locating republicanism in the judiciary, despite Michel-
man and Sunstein's personal aversion to elitism, demonstrates how
elitism is hopelessly intertwined with republican theory." If our
goal is to recast the role of popular participants in decisionmaking
for the community, "it seems odd to look for primary guidance
from the courts."85 Reliance on the judiciary as the watchdogs of
republicanism impacts most heavily on women, Blacks and other
oppressed groups because the judiciary is predominantly comprised
of white males."
Subsequent proposals by Michelman and Sunstein to place re-
publican self-government in local , communities and other interme-
diate groups also evidence elitist attitudes, although in more subtle
"° See Kerber, supra note 74, at 1671.
et See ROSABETH M. KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION 4-5 (1977) (anal-
ogizing corporate structure to stereotypical family patriarchal structure).
82 Kathryn Abrams, Law's Republicanism, 97 YALE L.J. 1591, 1604 (1988).
as Fitts, supra note 96, at 1653.
" See Pope, supra note 45, at 300-01 ("To suggest that judges, who are typically white,
male, and rich, can virtually represent the rest of us is to forget the legacy of legal realism,
something that I doubt Michelman intends.") (footnote omitted).
85 Abrams, supra note 82, at 1604.
88 See THE FEMINIST MAJORITY, THE FEMINIZATION OF POWER: WOMEN IN THE LAW 3
(1990) (women represent only 7.2% of state court full-time judges (25 states have no woman
serving on the state supreme court), 7.4% of the full-time federal judges, 9.5% of the U.S.
circuit judges, and 11.1% (1 out of 9) of the United States Supreme Court justices; statistics
for African-American women are even lower).
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form. 87
 For example, the Michelman/Sunstein formulation of re-
publicanism relies upon the judiciary to help ensure that legislators
do not "reflexively" follow their constituents' interests. 88 Similarly,
Sunstein's description of the process of deliberation reveals his con-
tinuing preoccupation with the need for representatives who are
more likely to make "intelligent and virtuous decisions for the public
good than is the public itself," 89
 a concept of deliberation that is
inconsistent with his concern for broad participation in the political
process.9° In short, modern republicanism continues the tradition
of an insulated, representative democracy,91
 thus reinforcing the
social realities of patriarchy and racial subordination.
2. The Republican Model in Labor Law
The Wagner Act, modeled on the larger political democratic
structure, imports a republican model of representative government
into the workplace. Although the drafters of the Wagner Act were
concerned primarily with establishing a balance of power between
individual employees and employers in order to avoid strikes and
the consequent interruption of commerce, they were also interested
in empowering workers economically and in promoting workplace
democracy, which was thought to enhance political democracy. 92
e See Pope, supra note 45, at 302 & n.66.
" Fitts, supra note 46, at 1653.
" H. Jefferson Powell, Reviving Republicanism, 97 YALE Li. 1703, 1708 (1988).
Id.
9' See Fitts, supra note 46, at 1653.
92
 Some commentators have argued that Congress's primary concern in enacting the
NLRA was the protection of employee rights, rather than the prevention of industrial strife.
See Note, Participatory Management Under Sections 2(3) and 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations
Act, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1736, 1759 (1985). The Act's legislative history and historical context,
however, make this position "virtually indefensible." Shaun G. Clarke, Note, Rethinking The
Adversarial Model in Labor Relations: An Argument for Repeal of Section 8(a)(2), 96 YALE L.J.
2021, 2033 (1987); see also Marion Crain, Building Solidarity Through Expansion of NLRA
Coverage: A Blueprint For Worker Empowerment, 74 MINN. L. REV. 953, 965-66 (1990) (pre-
serving industrial peace and flow of commerce was basis for congressional jurisdiction to
legislate in the area and key to political feasibility of its passage).
Whatever can be said about Congress's original intent, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that the attainment of industrial peace takes precedence over protecting employee
rights or insuring workplace democracy. The Court has consistently resolved the tension
between protecting employee rights, and preserving industrial peace and the uninterrupted
flow of commerce, in favor of the latter. See, e.g., First Nail Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB,
452 U.S. 666, 679 (1981) (no duty to bargain over management decision to partially close
business when burden placed on conduct of business outweighs benefit to collective bargain-
ing process); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104-06 (1962) (no-strike
clause implied in collective bargaining contract containing arbitration clause to preserve
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Like its prototype, republican democracy, the Wagner Act assumed
that democracy was best attained through a militaristic, win-lose
competition between the interests of the relevant constituencies—
here, employers and employees engaged in a struggle for control
of the workplace, production and the distribution of profits. With
the explicit goal of copying republican, representative democracy,
Congress established an adversarial system of rights, rules and pro-
cesses within which the contest was to be waged, and authorized
representatives on each side (managers for the companies, unions
for the employees) to conduct the battle. To help even out the
economic scales, individual employees were afforded a right to
organize against employers "organized in the corporate [form],""
and a right to engage in "concerted activities for the purpose of
collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 94
Collective bargaining was chosen by Congress as the preferred
means for resolving conflicts between workers and employers. 95
Collective bargaining is directly analogous to the legislative process
in the larger political democracy. Its primary goal is the efficient
management of the enterprise, which in turn leads to industrial
peace and uninterrupted production. The underlying assumption
is that the workplace is hierarchically ordered and that workers,
who occupy the bottom rungs on the hierarchy, must be con-
industrial peace); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (sitdown
strikes unprotected by Act because they interrupt production); NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (employer may permanently replace striking employees
in order to continue business).
95 National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). Section one states:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full
freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and employers who are
organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce .... [P]rotection by law of the right
of employees to organize and bargain collectively ... promotes the flow of
commerce . . . by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers
and employees.
Id.
94 National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). As one writer summarized
the Act's approach:
The essential idea embodied in the [Wagner] Act is that worker representation
involves balancing the power of management by building a parallel organization
of workers. One behemoth, according to this logic, can best be controlled by
another one. The concept requires the drawing of a series of lines to establish
the field of battle: one defining workers as opposed to management, another
defining the issues about which they must bargain, and a third marking legiti-
mate tactics in the contest.
HECKSCHER, supra note 8, at 7.
95 See National Labor Relations Act, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1988).
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trolled.96
 The concept is made more palatable through the use of
democratic rhetoric: the workplace is a place that must be "gov-
erned," and the workers may "choose" their "representative" in the
legislative process. 97
Scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement
have argued persuasively that collective bargaining law "aims to
legitimate and justify unnecessary and destructive hierarchy and
domination in the workplace," and that it has "evolved an institu-
tional architecture . . . that reinforces this hierarchy and domina-
tion."98
 Accordingly, labor law "promises a modicum of democratic
participation to encourage worker acceptance of," and consent to,
the hierarchical and authoritarian character of the workplace. 99
"Liberal labor theory," as Karl Klare has dubbed the legislative
analogy and the assumptions supporting it, thus utilizes collective
bargaining law as a means of coopting the labor movement into a
"junior partnership" role with management.'°°
Perhaps most strikingly reminiscent of republican tradition, the
Wagner Act sought to ensure an autonomous representative for
employees—the labor union—exclusively through which employees
would advance their interests.'°' Congress defined who was covered
by the NLRA (and so who might organize); 102 regulated when,
96 Some scholars have assumed that authoritarian structure and hierarchy in the work-
place are "inevitable," because such a structure emanates from the very "nature of the modern
industrial enterprise." David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement,
61 CAL. L. REV. 663, 721 (1973).
See id. at 726, 742; Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 13, at 460.
" See Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 13, at 452.
99 Id. at 459-60 (1981) (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578, 582 (1960)).
'°° See id. at 455 n.17; see also AnisoN, supra note 13, at 8.
1 ° 1 See National Labor Relations Act, § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988) ("Employees shall have
the right to . . . bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing .. ..").
102
 The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 effectuated management's need for faithful agents to
represent it by excluding supervisors from the definition of "employee" in the Act. See id.
§ 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) ("The term 'employee' . . . shall not include . . . any individual
employed as a supervisor."). The Supreme Court, reasoning that because managerial em-
ployees were higher in the authority structure than supervisors, has held that managerial
employees and confidential employees with a "labor relations nexus" were also representatives
of the employer rather than "employees" covered by the Act. See NLRB v. Hendricks County
Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 187-88 (1981) (confidential employees assisting
or acting in a confidential relation to persons exercising managerial functions in the field of
labor relations); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1974) (managerial
employees). See generally Crain, supra note 92 (arguing that attempt to draw the line between
covered employees and excluded supervisors, managers and confidential employees stratifies
the laboring class and undermines labor solidarity).
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where, and by whom organizing might be accomplished;"" and
established an election system to determine whether a particular
union represented a majority of the employees. 104 Finally, Congress
enacted section 8(a)(2), which ensured that unions were free from
employer domination or assistance, and section 9(a), which afforded
unions exclusivity in representing employees on issues of wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.m 5 Both sections
advanced the notion, typical of republicanism's aspirations of
achieving the public good, that the good of the group takes prece-
dence over the good of individuals. 106
'"' See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S. Ct. 841, 848 (1992) (rejecting Board's jean
Country balancing test and reaffirming and narrowing Babcock & Wilcox rule: no balancing of
employees' Section 7 rights against the employer's property rights is appropriate unless non-
employee union organizers lack reasonable access to employees outside the employer's prop-
erty; such access is absent only where the location of the plant and the living quarters of the
employees place them beyond the union's reach, and not where access is merely cumbersome
or difficult, as in a large metropolitan area); NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S, 105,
112 (1956) (non-employee organizers may not trespass on employer's property in order to
communicate information about the union to employees unless there exists no other means
of access); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 802 n.8, 803 (1945) (upholding
NLRB determination that employees may organize before and after working hours, during
rest periods and lunch breaks, but not during "working time").
114 Section 9 of the Act establishes the electoral procedure for selection of the union
authorized to represent the employees. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988) ("Representatives
designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining .. . .").
205 Id. §§ 158(a)(2), 159(a).
206 See J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944) (invalidating individual contracts
of employees with employer where they served as limits on rights of the employees under
the collective bargaining agreement). Thep. Case Court stated that "[t]he very purpose of
providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the terms of separate
agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power and
serve the welfare of the group." Id. The strength of this principle has been reinforced in the
duty of fair representation cases, where the courts have consistently held that, although the
union does owe a duty of fair representation to its individual members, the union's primary
duty is to serve the good of the membership in general, rather than the individual. See Vaca
v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190, 195 (1967) (breach of union's duty of fair representation "occurs
only when a union's conduct toward a member of the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary,
discriminatory, or in bad faith"; thus, individual employee has no absolute right to have his
grievance taken to arbitration); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 204
(1944) (if union is to enjoy the cloak of exclusivity conferred by section 9(a), it owes a
correlative duty to represent all employees within the bargaining unit "without hostile dis-
crimination, fairly, impartially and in good faith").
This principle is referred to by students in my labor law classes as the "Spock" rule, in
reference to a statement made by Spock during one of the Star Trek movies, as he sacrificed
his own life (temporarily, as sequels later disclosed) to save the crew of the starship Enterprise.
Spock justified his own demise with the declaration that "the good of the many outweighs
the good of the few . . or the one." STAR TREK 11: THE WRATH OF KHAN (Paramount
Pictures 1982).
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Once the union is authorized to serve as the employees' exclu-
sive representative, the Wagner Act imposed an obligation to bar-
gain in "good faith" over "wages, hours, and other terms and con-
ditions of employment,"'" and otherwise left the parties to the
'free play of contending economic forces' in negotiating a labor
contract.'" Nevertheless, the NLRA undertakes to regulate the use
of economic weapons by both parties by affording protection to
some employee activities (the primary strike), 109 leaving others un-
protected (the sitdown strike,"° wildcat strikes," and the slow-
down)," 2 and prohibiting certain others (secondary boycotts," 3 or-
ganizational or recognitional picketing, 114 and hot cargo
122
 National Labor Relations Act, 8(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
I" See Lodge 76, lnt'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n,
427 U.S. 132, 140 n.4 (1976) (quoting Howard Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent
Reaffirmation of Garmon, 72 CoLum. L. REV. 469, 478 (1972)). The Court also quoted with
approval the following remarks by Archibald Cox regarding the congressional intent behind
the NLRA:
An appreciation of the true character of the national labor policy expressed in
the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act] and the LMRA [Labor Management
Relations Act] indicates that in providing a legal framework for union organi-
zation, collective bargaining, and the conduct of labor disputes, Congress struck
a balance of protection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union orga-
nization, collective bargaining, and labor disputes.
Id. at 140 n.4 (quoting Archibald Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337,
1352 (1972)).
'" See National Labor Relations Act, 7, 29 U.S.C. 157 (1988) ("Employees shall have
the right to ... engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining
or other mutual aid or protection . . ."); see also id. § 13, 29 U.S.C. § 163 ("Nothing in this
Act ... shall be construed so as to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike .. . .").
10 See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 254-55 (1939) (illegal
sitdown strike by trespassing employees in response to employer unfair labor practices
removes the right to reinstatement that employees would otherwise possess).
", Wildcat strikes—strikes that are unauthorized by the union, although otherwise
lawful—are characterized as unprotected activity in some circuits, either because they dero-
gate from the union's status as exclusive representative, or because they undermine the
institutionalized collective bargaining structure. See, e.g., NLRB v. Shop-Rite Foods, 430 F.2d
786, 791 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that an unauthorized walkout to protest an employee's
discharge "could only undermine the goals of democracy in the union and effective labor
adjustment through the bargaining process"). See generally ATLESON, supra note 13, at 77-81;
Gould, The Status of Unauthorized and Wildcat Strikes Under the NLRA, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 672
(1967).
112 See Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333 (1950) (slowdown in work production not
protected concerted activity). But see NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477
(1960) (slowdowns, while unprotected, do not constitute bad faith bargaining; nevertheless,
employer can sanction employees by discharging them).
113 See National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(4) (1988).
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agreements). 115 Similarly, although the NLRA explicitly forbids em-
ployers from utilizing certain economic weapons (discriminatory or
retaliatory discharges), "6 the Supreme Court has protected certain
employer activities designed to maintain production in the face of
employee unrest. These activities include the right to permanently
replace economic strikers," 7 the right to close a business completely
without liability for discrimination," 8 and the right to purchase a
business without assuming its labor contract." 9
In short, Congress's initial assumption, that employees and
employers possess a fundamental conflict of interest in how the
workplace is to be run and how the profits of the enterprise are to
be distributed, dictated an adversarial approach to the process of
allocating power between employees, the union and the employer.
Judges attempting to interpret the labor laws have necessarily fo-
cused on creating rules and drawing lines to enhance the fairness
of the adversarial game; hence, the insistence upon drawing a line
between employer and employee, between when and where union
organizing may and may not take place, between when employer
anti-union campaigns may and may not be conducted, between
mandatory and permissive subjects of bargaining under the NLRA,
between good faith and bad faith bargaining, and between what is
and what is not protected economic activity.
C. The Adversarial Model of Power Allocation Under Labor Law
The Department of Labor has described the framework of
United States labor law as "tending to produce collective bargaining
relationships that are legalistic, rule-driven, and confrontational." 2°
13 See id. § 8(e), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e).
16 See id. § 8(a)(3), 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), 158(a)(4).
1 " See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938) (despite the
explicit protection afforded the right to strike in the Act, an employer does not lose "the
right to protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he
is not bound to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the
latter to resume their employment, in order to create places for them.").
See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 265, 269 (1965) (decisions
to end a business are "so peculiarly matters of management prerogative that they would
never constitute violations of § 8(a)(1), whether or not they involved sound business judgment,
unless they also violated § 8(a)(3)").
"6 See NLRB v. Burns Intl Sec. Servs., Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 288 (1972) (Court refused
to "saddle" new employer with terms and conditions of employment contained in its prede-
cessor's labor contract because to do so might discourage the transfer of capital).
' 2° BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP'T
OF LABOR, U.S. LABOR LAW AND THE FUTURE. OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT COOPERATION: FINAL
REPORT 141 (1989).
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At the heart of the labor laws is a belief that the interests of labor
and capital are necessarily adverse, and that labor and capital are
therefore adversaries. The assumption that the employer and the
employees have antithetical interests is reflected in three basic tenets
of the NLRA: first, the division of workers into two categories,
"employees," who are represented by the union, and "supervisors"
or "managers," who represent the employer; second, the definition
of a labor organization by reference to its dealings with the adverse
party, the employer, and an accompanying proscription against em-
ployer domination or support of labor organizations; and third, the
principle of exclusive representation of employees by the labor
organization.
I. The Definition of "Employees" Covered Under the NLRA
Under the NLRA, collective bargaining is carried out between
two independent players with inevitably conflicting interests: the
employer, represented by supervisory and managerial personnel,
and the union, representing the other employees. In the adversarial
model of the NLRA, the centrality of separation of the competitors
is clear; strict separation between the parties to collective bargaining
must be maintained for bargaining to be fair.' 21
The separation between employees and employers is main-
tained at the individual level through the definition of "employee"
in section 2(3) of the NLRA, which excludes supervisors from the
definition of "employee." 122 The rationale for the exclusion of su-
pervisors is the employer's need for front-line representatives in its
dealings with employees; it was considered vital that supervisors'
loyalties not be divided between the employer and the union.'" The
121 The NLRA's adversarial model and the separation of parties that it requires has
received a great deal of criticism from scholars. See, e.g., Michael C. Harper, Reconciling
Collective Bargaining With Employee Supervision of Management, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 7-9 (1988);
Thomas C. Kohler, Models of Worker Participation: The Uncertain Significance of Section 8(a)(2),
27 B.C. L. REV. 499, 513-16 (1986); Clarke, supra note 92, at 2022 n.7; Note, Collective
Bargaining as an Industrial System: An Argument Against Judicial Revision of Section 8(a)(2) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1662, 1673-80 (1983) [hereinafter Collective
Bargaining as an Industrial System]. See generally Robert A. McCormick, Union Representatives
As Corporate Directors: The Challenge to the Adversarial Model of Labor Relations, 15 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 219 (1982) (discussing limitations the adversarial model imposes on union influence on
business decisions, and considering implications for employees of affording labor a broader
role in corporate governance).
122 Section 2(3) of the NLRA provides: "[t]tle term 'employee' ... shall not include ..
any individual employed as a supervisor." 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1988). The term "supervisor"
is defined in § 2(11), 29 U.S.C. 152(11).
145 See Crain, supra note 92, at 972-73.
May 1992]
	
IMAGES OF POWER	 505
exclusion was later expanded to include employees acting in man-
agerial or confidential capacities. 124 As I have argued previously,
this division of the work force siphons off some of the most edu-
cated and most powerful members of the work force, factionalizing
the work force and hampering effective collective resistance to em-
ployer power. 125
2. The Definition of a Labor Organization by Reference to Its
Dealings with the Opposition and to the Proscription Against
Employer Domination or Support
The exclusion of supervisory and managerial employees from
the union ranks is balanced by section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA, which
makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to "dominate or
interfere with the formation or administration of any labor orga-
nization or contribute financial or other support to it." 26 Section
8(a)(2) was designed to eradicate the "company union," a company-
controlled organization instituted by employers to pacify employees
and thereby stave off union organizing efforts, especially those
conducted on a multi-shop scale.' 27
Since section 8(a)(2) applies only to employer domination, in-
terference or assistance with a "labor organization," a threshold
"4 See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170, 187-
90 (1981) (confidential employees who assist or act in a confidential relation to persons
exercising managerial functions in the field of labor relations are excluded from NLRA
coverage); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 283-84 (1974) (managerial employees
implicitly excluded from coverage under NLRA because they are higher than supervisors in
the authority structure of the workplace).
I25 Crain, supra note 92, at 1006 (labor laws ensure that the most powerful employees
are alienated and isolated from the laboring class). The ideology of individualism reflected
in the Taft-Hartley Amendments to the NLRA is perhaps the Act's most harmful legacy for
American workers. See id. at 1008, 1013 & n.346 (nonunionized middle-level employees
vulnerable to discharge are victims of their own individualistic philosophy); see also Joel
Rogers, Divide and Conquer: Further "Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Laws," 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1, 8-9, 144 (arguing that the Taft-Hartley Amendments codified
and furthered the weakness of American unions because they fragmented organized labor
by imposing limits on coordinated bargaining strategies, and encouraging the pursuit of
particularistic bargaining strategies; Rogers dubs this approach the "divide and conquer"
strategy).
'26 National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1988).
127 See 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR REuvrtoxs ACT, 1935, at .15-16 (1949) (statement of Senator Wagner).
Senator Wagner was especially concerned with the possibility that company unions would
limit employee collective action to a single shop, operating to deprive workers of the "wider
cooperation [across employer units] which is necessary . . . to stabilize and standardize wage
levels .. ." Id.
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issue is the status of an entity as a labor organization. The term
"labor organization" is identified by reference to a group's dealings
with the employer. Section 2(5) of the Act defines a labor organi-
zation as "any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan, in which employees participate
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work." 28
In recent years, many employers have initiated "participatory
management" schemes in an effort to forestall worker dissatisfaction
and to increase productivity. These organizations take various
forms, each tailored to the employer's primary goal in implementing
it. The three most popular are Quality Control Circles, which are
organized on a department level and focus on increasing production
and improving product quality; Quality-of-Work-Life programs,
which give employees a limited hand in shaping their immediate
work environments, and which typically originate as an effort to
generate loyalty and stem dissatisfaction; and Board of Director
Participation programs, which place a worker representative on a
company's board of directors, usually with the goal of obtaining
concessions from labor by nominally involving it in the strategic
corporate planning process.' 29
The courts, torn between striving to prevent the resuscitation
of the company union by another name and the desire to encourage
efforts at cooperation between parties that have historically been
hostile, have carefully scrutinized these organizations to determine
whether they qualify as "labor organizations" under the NLRA.
They have developed three methods of determining status as a labor
organization under section 2(5): looking to the form it assumes, the
subject matter it deals with, or the function it serves.'" To be
classified as a labor organization, an entity may assume virtually any
structure, must deal with the employer over "conditions of work"
(broadly construed), and must exist to represent its member-em-
ployees."'
The circuit courts are split in applying the standard. The Sev-
enth and Second Circuit courts construe the term labor organization
' 28 National Labor Relations Act, § 2(5), 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1988).
' 29 See Andrew A. Lipsky, Comment, Participatory Management Schemes, The Law, and
Workers' Rights: A Proposed Framework of Analysis, 39 Aat. U. L. Rev. 667,673-75 (1990).
' 3° Id. at 688-89.
131 Id. at 689-90.
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very broadly, finding labor organization status even in the absence
of formal structure, constitution or bylaws, officers, dues require-
ments or continuing existence.' 32 This broad construction of section
2(5) operates to disestablish many participative management
schemes because they involve employer domination or assistance
that violates section 8(a)(2) of the NLRA. By contrast, the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals has imposed a more restrictive definition
of a labor organization, resulting in the conclusion that many em-
ployee committees are not section 2(5) labor organizations, but
merely part of an "enlightened personnel policy"; hence, they do
not violate section 8(a)(2).'ss
The legislative history of section 8(a)(2) indicates that Congress
intended to promote communication between management and la-
bor.'" Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress also intended to limit
the realm in which permissible cooperation between capital and
labor might occur."' Cooperation was to be accomplished by good
faith bargaining between two independent entities—employer and
union—over terms and conditions of employment.' 56 The courts
have struggled with application of the section 8(a)(2) "domination
or support" test where employers have sought to cooperate directly
with employees in cooperative management programs that fit within
the definition of a labor organization under section 2(5) of the Act.
In Newport News Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., the Supreme Court
originally interpreted section 8(a)(2) very strictly, mandating the
disestablishment of employer-assisted representation plans regard-
less of the employees' satisfaction with the plan and the employer's
132 See NLRB v. Ampex Corp., 442 F.2d 82, 84 (7th Cir. 1971) (informal, randomly
chosen "communications committee" that employer claimed acted as glorified suggestion box,
was deemed to be a labor organization); Pacemaker Corp. v. NLRB, 260 F.2d 880, 883 (7th
Cir. 1958) (lack of officers does not prevent finding of section 2(5) status); NLRB v. Stow
Mfg. Co., 217 F.2d 900, 903-04 (2d Cir. 1954) (informal monthly meeting sufficient to
indicate section 2(5) labor organization), cert. denied, 348 U.S 964 (1955); NLRB v. Indiana
Metal Prods. Corp., 202 F.2d 613, 620-21 (7th Cir. 1953) (lack of constitution or bylaws does
not preclude finding of section 2(5) labor organization status); NLRB v. American Furnace
Co., 158 F.2d 376, 378 (7th Cir. 1946) (finding labor organization status despite lack of
continuity); Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 153 F.2d 480, 482 (7th Cir. 1946) (finding labor
organization status despite absence of dues).
'3' See NLRB v. Streamway Div. of Scott & Fetzer, 691 F.2d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 1982).
I" See Lipsky, supra note 129, at 697-98 (congressional committee eliminated proposed
terms "initiate" and "influence" in drafting section 8(0(2), which demonstrates that Congress
intended to permit communication and to promote cooperaton accomplished through col-
lective bargaining).
155 Id.
1i6 See National Labor Relations Act §1 8(a)(2), 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(2), 158(d),
159(a) (1988); Lipsky, supra note 129, at 696-97.
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motives in establishing it. "7 Subsequently, however, the circuit
courts have again split on the question of how to treat employer-
initiated employee participation plans. The First, Sixth, Seventh and
Ninth Circuits, reasoning that courts should encourage cooperative
labor-management relations, have refined the Supreme Court's test.
These courts have upheld participatory plans where there is no
evidence of anti-union animus on the employer's part, and no em-
ployee dissatisfaction with the plan.'" A few circuits have followed
a more traditional approach, striking down such employee partici-
pation plans in the absence of clear anti-union animus or employee
dissatisfaction with the employee committee.'"
Section 2(5) and 8(a)(2) are instrumental in shaping the struc-
ture and culture of organized labor along oppositional lines. By
defining labor unions as "other," and by setting them up in oppo-
sition to organized capital, the law ensures that labor unions will
'" 308 U.S. 241, 251 (1939).
138 See NLRB v. Northeastern Univ., 601 F.2d 1208, 1214 (1st Cir. 1979) (changing
conditions in labor-management relations suggest need to allow alternatives to traditional
adversary model); Hertzka & Knowles v. NLRB, 503 F.2d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 1974) (condem-
nation of cooperative model reflecting employees' free choice would condone adversarial
model of labor relations); Modern Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 379 F.2d 201, 204 (6th Cir. 1967)
(assistance from employer not necessarily tantamount to support or domination); Chicago
Rawhide Mfg. v. NLRB, 221 F.2d 165, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1955) (cooperation between labor
and management is primary goal of NLRA).
155 See, e.g., Irving Air Chute Co. v. NLRB, 350 F.2d 176, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1965) (finding
8(a)(2) violation where there was employer support, but no domination). The question of
how to interpret sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2) is currently before the Board in the Electromation,
Inc. case, N.L.R.B. No. 25—CA-19818. In that case, an administrative law judge ruled that
"employee action committees" formed by the employer in response to employee discontent,
for the purpose of providing input on mandatory bargaining subjects (overtime, tardiness,
wages, bonuses, attendance, bereavement leave, sick leave and incentive pay), were labor
organizations within the meaning of section 2(5) of the Act. See Charles J. Morris, National
Labor Policy: Worker Participation and the Role of the NLRB, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 43, at
E-1, E-2 (Mar. 4, 1992) (containing text of speech presented February 6, 1992, at the 1992
Southern California Labor and Employment Law Symposium, Los Angeles, California). The
administrative law judge also concluded that the employer had violated section 8(a)(2),
reasoning that the employer had unlawfully dominated and supported the action committees
by initiating them; choosing the employee representatives who would sit on them; determin-
ing the subject matter to be discussed; determining size and composition of the committees;
paying employees for attendance at committee meetings; holding all meetings on company
premises and providing company support services; and continuing to encourage the joint-
committee process during and after the union organization and election process. Id. at E-3.
As Morris points out, Electromation should be an "easy case" because it does not involve the
sort of worker participation entailed in work teams, quality circles or groups concerned with
the manner of job performance. Id. at E-1. Morris predicts that the Board "will have no
choice but to uphold the administrative law judge's determination," despite an aggressive
campiign by the organized management community to influence the Board to reverse the
administrative law judge's decision. Id. at E-1, E-3.
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strive to conform to the structure and function of capital. Otherwise,
unions would risk becoming marginalized. In effect, the law estab-
lishes an organizational norm—that of a bureaucratic, militaristic
organization where power is centralized—to which unions must
adhere if they desire to compete with capital on the legal playing
field. Sociological studies show that unions have done exactly that.'"
Because unions' source of power has historically been the sense of
solidarity and community inspired by working together toward a
common, positive end (producton of goods or the provision of
services), power has been expressed in a decentralized, spontaneous
form. The shift to reliance on centralized decisionmaking and to
the exercise of power in a militaristic fashion has altered the char-
acter of the modern union, straitjacketing unions into corporate
bureaucratic styles and, ultimately, disempowering them. 141
3. Exclusive Representation of Employees by the Union
Section 9(a) of the NLRA completes the foundation of the
adversarial model; it guarantees that only bargaining units ap-
proved by the NLRB may bargain with employers on behalf of
employees over "rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other
conditions of employment." 142 Under the so-called "exclusivity doc-
trine" established by section 9(a), a duly certified union is the sole
representative with which the employer may deal concerning man-
datory subjects of bargaining.' 43 Its corollary, the duty of fair rep-
resentation owed by the union to its members individually and
collectively, is designed to deter discrimination against minority
interests within the union.'"
Section 9(a) thus affords unions monopolistic status as the voice
of employees. Operating against the backdrop of an exclusionary
and discriminatory union structure, 145 section 9(a) ensures that the
"u Crain, supra note 23, at 24-28 (parallelism in organizational philosophy, structure
and tactics of oppositional groups within a common legal environment is predictable; orga-
nizations will tend to model themselves after more legitimate, successful oppositional orga-
nizations, particularly where one organization is dependent on another).
'" See id. at 28-31.
142 National Labor Relations Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
143 Lipsky, supra note 129, at 702-08.
" See Vara v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) ("[T]he exclusive agent's statutory
authority to represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to
serve the interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any ....'').
$45 There can be no doubt that modern union structure continues a tradition of discrim-
ination against women and minorities, systematically excluding them from representation
and power. See DAN LA Borz, RANK AND FILE REBELLION 79 (1990) (describing sweetheart
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most oppressed workers—typically women and minorities—will
have no voice at all in the workplace.
These three fundamental principles, embodied in four sections
of the Act—section 2(3), defining individuals as employees or rep-
resentatives of the employer; section 2(5), defining a labor organi-
zation and the subject matter over which it is to deal; section 8(a)(2),
prohibiting employer domination and interference with labor
unions; and section 9(a), conferring exclusive representative status
on NLRB-certified labor unions—collectively represent Congress's
conclusion that channeling conflict into collective bargaining is the
surest route to industrial peace.' 48 These provisions reflect under-
lying assumptions that the interests of employees and employers
are necessarily in conflict, that confrontation over the division of
scarce resources is inevitable, and that such conflicts are best re-
solved exclusively through participation in an adversarial process
of decisionmaking. In my view, these assumptions are all based upon
a patriarchal understanding of power.
II. A FEMINIST THEORY OF POWER AND ITS ALLOCATION
The labor laws, as well as the history of labor unionism, help
to institutionalize what one commentator has dubbed the "adver-
sarial culture in American labor-management relations." 47 As I
discuss in this section, American labor law essentially translated the
early communitarianism of the labor movement into two separate
and opposing communities—a community of workers and a com-
munity of managers—and sanctified them by law. Because theories
of community are implicitly theories of power,' 48 I turn first to an
examination of an alternative theory of power that would support
a more liberating restructuring of workplace communities.
deals in Teamsters Union contract negotiations in which the rights of women and racial
minorities were compromised in return for benefits to white male majority members); Crain,
supra note 5, at 1168-69, 1183-89 (gender stereotypes held by union members are reflected
in a paucity of women in the ranks of union officers and organizers, as well as in the failure
to close the wage gap between the sexes in collective bargaining).
"5 See Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System, supra note 121, at 1678.
147 Clarke, supra note 92, at 2042. Indeed, the adversarial stance taken by unions
operating under the labor laws has led some commentators to conclude that American unions
and unionism are fundamentally incompatible with cooperative approaches designed to
enhance productivity and insure industrial peace. See, e.g., id. at 2039-49 (advocating repeal
of section 8(a)(2) to facilitate labor-management cooperation).
148 See HARTSOCK, supra note 33, at 3.
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A. A Feminist Theory of Power
Feminists who have undertaken a reevaluation of the concept
of power have uniformly rejected understandings of power that
focus on domination and control. 149 Instead, feminists have defined
power as referring to energy, ability, capacity and freedom.' 5° This
vision of power, often referred to in the sociological and political
literature as "power to," as distinguished from "power over," 15 ' is
uniquely feminine because it is a product of women's experience of
power through motherhood. As mothers, women create life and
nurture children; consequently, women develop a form of female
power that is creative, beneficent and generative. 152 I refer to this
understanding of power as feminist because its focus is on empow-
erment, whether achieved through the direct production of ideas
or art, through stimulating productive effort in others, or through
heightening vitality.'"
In contrast to patriarchal forms of power, which are grounded
upon material resources, feminist power is a capacity or relation
between people, and thus draws its legitimacy from the existence
of a community.' 54 Power in the community emanates horizontally
and is distributed in a web-like pattern; those who exercise power
are positioned at the center of the group, where they act to mobilize
others. 155 Such a structure exists in marked contrast to patriarchal
distributions of power, which are typically envisioned as hierarchi-
cal, with the power-wielders positioned at the top of a pyramidal
structure. 156
Finally, feminist power is realized by acting collectively through
communities to accomplish change. Feminine leadership is empow-
ering and participatory in nature.' 57 Grassroots feminist mobiliza-
tion has followed this pattern of collective empowerment, empow-
145 Id. at 225-26.
15 See, e.g., JEAN 13. MILLER, TOWARD A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN 116 (2d ed. 1986)
(power may be defined as "the capacity to implement," or the ability to influence others
without controlling, limiting or destroying them).
151 See FRENCH, supra note 34, at 505.
155 See ADRIENNE RICH, OF WOMAN BORN: MOTHERHOOD As EXPERIENCE AND INSTITU-
TION 73 (1976); HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, EROS AND POWER: THE PROMISE OF FEMINIST THEORY
149 (1986).
155 See Crain, supra note 23, at 55-56.
154 HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 44, 52 (1969).
155 Crain, supra note 23, at 66-71 (describing empirical evidence of existence of distinctly
feminine style of exercising power).
155 FRENCH, supra note 34, at 299-300; Crain, supra note 23, at 18.
157 Crain, supra note 23, at 68.
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ering individual women through group consciousness-raising that
examines women's position within their families, within their social
units, and ultimately, within the larger political context.' 58 The de-
velopment of a bond between women based upon common mem-
bership in a marginalized and oppressed group has helped to pre-
vent the replication of patriarchal concepts and practices of power.
Women's awareness of the reality of interdependence and women's
experience with caring and nurturing tends to result in an assump-
tion of responsibility for others, rather than an urge to dominate
them.'"
B. The Communitarian Model of Power Dispersion
Feminist power, with its emphasis on community, connection
and cooperation, is most consistent with communitarianism, a the-
ory of power allocation that favors similar values.' 60 Some scholars
have characterized the cultural feminist work of Gilligan as itself
embodying an articulation of a communitarian philosophy because
it privileges values of connection and caring, and thus contains an
implicit critique of individualism.' 6 '
158 See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 83-90
(1989) (describing process of consciousness-raising through which contemporary feminist
analysis of women's social condition has been shaped and shared).
159 See GILLIGAN, supra note 16, at 30. Of course, this has not been universally true. For
example, the white, middle and upper class women's "equal opportunity" movement has
historically excluded women of color and working class women. See supra note 5 and accom-
panying text. In the process, it has often replicated the patriarchal practice of power by
privileging some women (white, middle and upper class women) at the expense of others
(women of color and working class women) who occupy lower status positions in the social
hierarchy. See Crain, supra note 23, at 77.
1" A number of writers have noted the similarity between cultural feminist values (such
as those articulated by Carol Gilligan and her disciples) and communitarian values. See, e.g.,
Marilyn Friedman, Feminism and Modern Friendship: Dislocating the Community, 99 ETHICS 275,
275-77 (1989) (anti-individualist developments in feminist thought are strikingly similar to
those in new communitarianism); Linda]. Lacey, Introducing Feminist jurisprudence: An Analysis
of Oklahoma's Seduction Statute, 25 TULSA L.J. 775, 783 (1990) (much feminist jurisprudence
is communitarian, emphasizing ideals of cooperation and connection instead of competition
and autonomy); Joan C. Williams, Feminism's Search for the Feminine: Essentialism, Utopianism,
and Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 700, 708-09 (1990) (feminism, like communitarianism,
struggles to resolve tension between value of connection and tendency toward essentialism
and devaluation of diversity); see also Alex M. Johnson, The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J.
2007, 2054 n.198 (1991) (arguing that critical race theory, like the "difference" strand of
feminist theory, is communitarian).
161 See Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REY.
939, 941-42 (1990) (Gilligan's message resonates with and reinforces the message of corn-
munitarians that connection and relation are as important as freedom and independence).
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Communitarians perceive the self as a being shaped and de-
fined by its attachments, including its social relationships, family
and community ties, and its historical context.'" The self is contex-
tual, and the individual "is viewed as part of the community, si-
multaneously shaping the community to which [s]he belongs and
being shaped by it" through a continuing dialogue. 16"
The "new communitarianism" that has spawned such popular
books as Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American
Life 164 has evolved largely as a critique of possessive individualism.
The essence of communitarianism is described as "a deemphasizing
of individualism and individual rights—which are so important for the
liberal view of self—and privileging of the individual's role in the
community so as to realize the attainment of right actions that lead
to good consequences within the larger community." 65 Communi-
tarians acknowledge the inherent potential for tension between the
larger good and self-interest, and suggest that our contemporary
understanding of love is predicated on an individualism so deeply
ingrained that it shapes the very meaning of love, creating conflict
where there may be none." They posit a form of individualism
that is fulfilled in community rather than against it.' 67
Some feminists have criticized communitarian theory because
its historical focus on traditional communities, particularly the fam-
ily, condones traditional communal norms of gender subordina-
tion.'" Nevertheless, communitarian theory retains sufficient ap-
peal to justify efforts at re-conceptualizing it within the context of
chosen, voluntary communities, rather than limiting it to the tra-
ditional communities of family, neighborhood, school and
church.'" Marilyn Friedman goes further, displaying a willingness
to demarcate pro-active 17° communities by reference to immutable
162 See MICHAEL SANE/EL, LIBERALISM AND THE'LIMITS OF JUSTICE 179-81 (1982); Fried-
man, supra note 160; at 275-76; Alexander, supra note 16, at 23; see also ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 6-21 (1981); Amy Gutman, Communitarian Critics of Liberalism, 14 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 308,310 (1985).
' 63 Johnson, supra note 160, at 2056.
' 81 ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT
IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985).
' 65 Johnson, supra note 160, at 2055.
'68 See BELLAH ET AL., supra note 164, at 108.
167
 Id. at 162.
168 See Friedman, supra note 160, at 280-81.
169 Id. at 287-88. Kathleen Sullivan has expressed similar ideas in the context of repub-
lican theory. See Sullivan, supra note 72, at 1714.
170 By "pro-active" 1 refer to chosen, voluntary communities; but it means more than
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traits such as sex and race. To this end, Friedman defines a "com-
munity of choice" as "a community of people who share a common
oppression."'"
Indeed, gender subordination norms have been so central to
communitarianism that the characteristics that distinguish it from
republicanism, which shares a similar exclusionary history, are often
overlooked.' 72 Suzanna Sherry has argued that a feminine perspec-
tive is most consistent with a classical republican ( jeffersonian)
system of power allocation, in contrast to a masculine perspective,
which parallels pluralist liberal theory.' 73 Sherry uses the terms
"republicanism" and "communitarianism" interchangeably, ignor-
ing fundamental differences between the two traditions.' 74 In corn-
that here—it connotes the formation of groups initiated by their members for the purpose
of ending oppression.
" I Friedman, supra note 160, at 289-90. Sullivan disagrees with such an approach in
republican theory because it tends to institutionalize involuntary group cleavages in politics.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
172 See supra text accompanying note 63.
"3 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 45, at 543. Sherry is careful to distinguish a "feminine"
perspective from a "feminist" perspective. In her view, the former refers to the theory of
women's moral and psychological development articulated by Carol Gilligan, Nel Noddings
and Jean Baker Miller. See id. at 580 n.168. The latter, exemplified by the work of Zillah
Eisenstein, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Catharine MacKinnon and Diane Polan, is associated with
a political agenda. See id. at 583 & n.172.
174 See id. at 592, 601, 604. Sherry is not alone. See also Johnson, supra note 160, at
2011, who uses the two terms together as synonyms ("communitarianirepublican"). Johnson
acknowledges that a "semantic distinction" can be drawn between communitarianism as a
political philosophical theory of the individual's role within a community, and republicanism
as a vision of participatory government that is grounded in communitarianism. Id. at 2054
n.195.
Sherry describes the republican value of community and argues that republicanism is
group-focused, exalting the "good of the whole over the good of its individual members."
Sherry, supra note 45, at 551. The anti-pluralist nature of republicanism follows inevitably
from its anti-individualism; an important object of republican government is to structure a
shared, common value system for the community. Id. at 555. Thus, a republican system of
government has as its primary purpose the definition and prioritization of community values
and the creation, through education of the citizenry, of the public and private virtue necessary
to achieve those values. Id. at 551-52.
Although citizens in the republic have a right to participate in defining the public good,
their means of participation is not so clear. See id. at 555. Because Sherry favors the concept
of direct popular representation that is central to classical republican theory, she eschews the
"elitist, anti-egalitarian" features of Madisonian republicanism. Id. at 552 n.26. Nevertheless,
she acknowledges the value of "wisdom and judgment" in government, and thus necessarily
accepts along with it the elitist assumption that only certain citizens are sufficiently virtuous
to serve as representatives of the populace in government. See id. at 555. Eventually, Sherry
argues, both Hamilton and Jefferson came to doubt the capacity of the common people for
virtue; Hamilton sought to address the problem by limiting participation in government to
the wealthy, who were ostensibly of better moral character than the poor, while Jefferson
abandoned virtue altogether as the basis of good government, turning to a system of a
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munitarianism, unlike republicanism, control is from the bottom
up, rather than from the top down. Participatory government,
rather than representative democracy, is the goal, and consensus,
rather than majority rule, is the guiding principle. Further, instead
being a means to an end—for example, establishing rules to govern
the community or to further virtuous ideals that the government
has selected—the process of participatory government is the end.
It is the process of decisionmaking in communitarian systems
that renders communitarianism compatible with feminist theory.
The process of participating fully and directly in community value-
setting is itself a source of empowerment. This is a central tenet of
both cultural and radical feminism. 175
Perhaps it is understandable that legal theorists who have fo-
cused on republicanism have ignored the significance of participa-
tory democracy, thereby blurring the distinction between republi-
canism and communitarianism.'" Most theorists have considered
communitarianism either as an ethical/jurisprudential concept,'" or
as political theory suitable for adoption in national government.'"
Undeniably, participatory democracy, focused as it is on the elimi-
nation of hierarchy and on decentralization, works best in small,
homogeneous communities.' 79 Size restriction enables the mainte-
nance of collective control and the development of a sense of corn-
balance of powers in government to maintain order among competing factions. Id. at 557-
59. Ultimately, Sherry explains, the triumph of modern liberalism was the result of the
Jeffersonian shift in focus from ennobling the human spirit to regulating conflicting interests
characteristic of the "baser aspects" of human nature. Id. at 559-61.
175 According to Gilligan, both men and women recognize the need for agreement on
common values, but they see the process of reaching agreement as mediated in different
ways: for men, the process is to be handled "impersonally through systems of logic and law,"
for women it must be achieved "personally through communication in relationship." GILLt-
CAN, supra note 16, at 29. According to MacKinnon, feminist efforts are directed not only
toward obtaining for women the right to "play with the boys," but also toward obtaining the
right to participate in the process of rule-making, "to question why the point and ethic of
sports is competition." CA'rHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 28 (1987).
"if See Pope, supra note 45, at 303 (as republicanists have moved toward a focus on
direct participation by ordinary citizens in government, they have been confronted by the
dilemma of size: "Now are disempowered groups to engage in nationwide dialogue and law
making?").
177 See, e.g., Sherry, supra note 45, at 592 (describing the feminine communitarian
jurisprudence of Justice O'Connor).
178 See, e.g., Michelman, supra note 45, at 1493-94; Sunstein, supra note 45, at 1539;
Sunstein, supra note 54, at 47-48; Sunstein, supra note 62, at 429,
175
	 JOYCE ROTHSCHILD & J. ALLEN WHITT, THE COOPERATIVE WORKPLACE: POTEN-
TIALS AND DILEMMAS OF ORGANIZATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND PARTICIPATION 137-41 (1986)
(describing conditions that facilitate participatory democracy).
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munity, while homogeneity fosters group cohesion and eases the
process of consensus decisionmaking."°
Nevertheless, the possibility that communitarianism might
function well in groups whose composition is determined through
voluntary associations based upon common oppression's' remains
relatively uncharted territory.' 82 Several characteristics suggest that
the workplace might provide a fertile ground for such communities.
Work is a primary source of civic virtue.'" A primary goal of
communitarianism in the context of the workplace would be the
alteration of the meaning of work in our society, a "reappropriation
of the idea of vocation or calling, a return in a new way to the idea
of work as a contribution to the good of all and not merely as a
means to one's own advancement."'"
I" Id.; accord Staughton Lynd, Prospects For the New Left,  in STAUGHTON LYND & GAR
ALPEROVITZ, STRATEGY AND PROGRAM: TWO ESSAYS TOWARD A NEw AMERICAN SOCIALISM I,
25 (1973).
181 See supra text accompanying note 169.
182
 Such voluntary associations based upon a common oppression are typically organized
on a model of participatory democracy. In a limited-scope empirical study of workplace
collectives and cooperatives, Rothschild and Whitt describe the following structural attributes
as typical of these cotnmunitarian groups: (1) authority resides in the collective as a whole,
rather than attaching to individuals by virtue of their status in the hierarchy; (2) compliance
with the group's goals is determined by consensus of the collective, rather than by fixed rules
implemented by leaders; (3) there exists a practice of addressing problems on an ad hoc,
individualized basis, guided by ethics, rather than a practice of resolving dilemmas by appli-
cation of fixed and rigid rules; (4) social control is maintained through personal or moral
appeals rather than through standardized rules and sanctions; (5) an ideal of community,
rather than of impersonality, is observed; (6) solidarity incentives are primary, while material
incentives are secondary; (7) employment is based on socio-political values and personality,
rather than upon formal credentials; (8) there exists a lack of hierarchy, characterized by an
egalitarian structure; and (9) division of labor and segmentation of role or function are
minimized, replaced by wholistic roles. See ROTHSCHILD & Wnivr, supra note 179, at 50-64;
see also Joyce Rothschild-Whitt, The Collectivist Organization: An Alternative to Rational-Bureau-
cratic Models, 44 AM. Soc. Rev. 509, 519 (1979) (table outlining dimensions).
I" See BELLAH ET. AL, supra note 164, at 288.
'" Id. at 287-88. The authors' concern is with worker isolation and alienation. Where
work is interesting but lacks social utility (e.g., that done by many professionals), we must
cultivate a sense of the institution's contribution to the public good. Where routine work is
involved, it can be improved by affording workers a voice in the running of their enterprises.
Id. at 288.
In this regard, the authors echo the concerns of Karl Klare, Erich Fromm and Michael
Lerner. See ERICH FROMM, THE SANE Soclery 121-22 (1955) (modern workers' lack of control
over what is made, how it is made and how it will be used causes them to be alienated from
their work); MICHAEL LERNER, SURPLUS POWERLESSNESS 101, 333-34 (1986) (roots of occu-
pational stress lie in lack of power workers have to control production); Karl E. Klare, The
Labor Management Cooperation Debate: A Workplace Democracy Perspective, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REV. 39, 44 (1988) (advocating goal of active self-actualization and realization in work, an
experience of work that is developmental).
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Second, employer opposition to the organization of workplace
communities of employees would strengthen, rather than weaken,
such an organization: the community's solidarity and sense of pur-
pose tend to solidify in response to opposition, rendering it an ideal
"alternative" form of organization."' Third, communitarism is most
likely to succeed where it is combined with a social movement ori-
entation, such as the labor movement, because orientation to a
larger movement lessens the risk of cooptation. 186 Finally, partici-
pation in cooperative institutions organized around a communitar-
ian perspective itself educates members and generates further par-
ticipation by positively reinforcing earlier efforts.'" Direct action
participation in such organizations teaches members how to partic-
ipate effectively in governance. Once they become accustomed to
self-governance, they will want more, and will generalize their ex-
perience to the national level.'" Unlike the defensive nature of
participation in a republican system of representative government,
which exists to protect private interests, direct participation is
power-generating.'" Consequently, communitarianism holds
greater transformative potential to redistribute power to working
people, particularly women, than does republicanism.' 9°
C. The Communitarian Model in Labor Law jurisprudence
The original craft unions typical of the early labor movement
were communal in character, and sought to advance egalitarian
values and radical social ideals.' 9 ' The communitarian character of
the labor movement continued into the late nineteenth century,
encompassing unskilled worker organizations. 192 By the late nine-
teenth century, however, labor leaders had abandoned their original
communal structure in favor of a bureaucratic structure that mir-
185 RICK FANTASIA, CULTURES OF SOLIDARITY: CONSCIOUSNESS, ACTION AND CONTEMPO-
RARY AMERICAN WORKERS 25 ( 1988).
186 ROTHSCHILD & Wntrz, supra note 179, at 140.
187 Id. at 14.
188 See id. at 13.
189 Id.
199 Because of their commitment to providing working models for future society, mem-
bers of cooperatives and collectives see themselves as engaged in a process or "'pre-revolu-
tionary structure-making."' Id. at 17 (quoting MARTIN BUBER, PATHS OF UTOPIA (1960)). They
are "'creating organizations of people's power'" in opposition to capitalism. Id. (quoting a
subject in the author's study of communitarian groups).
191 HECKSCHER, MP/U. note 8, at 16-17; Crain, supra note 23, at 20.
192 HECKSCHER, supra note 8, at 16-17.
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rored the large corporations they opposed.'" Along with this
change in structure came a shift in labor's philosophy of unionism
towards a focus on wage gains and concrete benefits, and away from
radical political goals.' 94
Some commentators believe that the shift away from commu-
nitarianism as the system of power allocation, became inevitable as
the labor movement aged and grew. James Morone has theorized
that Americans feel a "democratic wish," the motivating force that
drives us toward communal democracy and results in institution-
building, but is nevertheless ultimately destined to fail.' 95 Morone
describes the "democratic wish" as a vision of "a single, united
people, bound together by a consensus over the public good which
is discerned through direct citizen participation in community set-
tings." 196 Ironically, although it is our suspicion of state power that
propels our democratic impulse, our efforts toward achieving direct
democracy have, in the end, only served to strengthen the bureau-
cracy of government.' 97 However radical they may be at their outset,
the institutions we create only succeed in further bureaucratizing
and empowering the government.
Though it makes for powerful rhetoric, "the people" is merely
a political fiction, the "democratic wish" a utopian vision that cannot
be achieved; thus, communal democracy is a myth.' 98 It accom-
plishes "large changes but small victories."' 99 Morone explains this
process of de-radicalization through invocation of the "democratic
wish." In his analysis, pressure for government action is blocked by
the checks of a liberal state; entrenched interests mobilize conser-
vative allies by raising the specter of socialism, and existing bureau-
19' See Crain, supra note 23, at 21.
' 94 See
' 95 JAMES A. MORONE, THE DEMOCRATIC WISH: POPULAR PARTICIPATION AND THE LIMITS
OE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 5, 7 (1990). According to Morone, Americans experience simul-
taneous dread and yearning with regard to the allocation of power; we dread the power of
the state, which poses a threat to individual liberty, while we yearn For direct, communal
democracy. Id. at 1.
1" Id. at 7. The democratic wish has four components: an image, a method, an assump-
tion and a setting. Id. at 5-7. The image is of the people as a single, united political entity,
an alternative locus of political authority. Id. at 5. The method is direct citizen participation
in politics, filtered through small republics. Id. at 5-6. The assumption is that the people
form a homogeneous body with a consensus about the shared public interest. Id. at 6. The
setting is the community. Id. at 7.
197 Id. at 1.
199 Id. at 4.
199 Id. at 9.
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cracies limit the possibilities for government action."° Reformers
overcome the standoff by calling on the people, thereby invoking
the "democratic wish. "201 The issues are returned to the relevant
"community," which implements new programs, only to have the
imagined consensus of the people deteriorate into a clash of inter-
ests, with previously suppressed groups vying for political legiti-
macy.202 Retrenchment follows, as the imperatives of organizational
maintenance replace the enthusiasm of mobilization. 2" Ultimately,
the new groups are incorporated into the existing structure, and
the administrative power of the government is extended still fur-
ther. 204
Applying his analysis to the organized labor movement, Mo-
rone argues that President Roosevelt's call to the people, using
rhetoric drawn from the republican tradition, triggered the mobi-
lization of workers into labor unions. 205 The union structure recon-
figured patterns of representation within the labor movement, and
the issue of the conflict between the interests of labor and capital
was returned to the workplace, with "industrial democracy" framed
as the common goal,'" The search for community yielded conflicts
between workers as well as between capital and labor, and the newly-
created administrative organizations wielded new state authority in
labor relations. 207 Ultimately, a new class of political participant was
legitimated: the labor union. 208 Class struggle was transformed into
a dispute over representation. 209 The workers themselves were in-
duced to restructure the labor movement, and to create the bu-
reaucracy that now restrains them. 21 ° Labor unions now fight for
"
marginal gains, their own stability and the preservation of the new
institutional status quo."2 "
200 Id. at 27.
201 Id. at 27-28.
202 Id, at 28.
200 Id. at 28-29.
204 Id. at 29.
204 Id. at 146.
206 See id. at 145-85.
Dr Id.
2°9 Id. at 184.
209 See id. at 145-85.
210 Id. at 184-85,
211 Id. at 185. In the end, Morone says, "a less grandiose democratic conception might
offer more real power to real people." Id. at 7. Morone calls for a refocusing on commuM.
tarian values, which he contends are more fragile than individualistic values. Id. at 335.
Despite the fact that the communal impulse has not yet found a permanent home at the
center of our political institutions, the democratic wish has endured, constantly resurfacing
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Nevertheless, labor law itself continues to reflect the "demo-
cratic wish." In contrast to liberal political theory, with its focus on
individual rights, the labor laws revolve around a qualitatively dif-
ferent kind of right: workers' right, guaranteed in section 7 of the
NLRA, "to engage in ... concerted activities for . . . mutual aid or
protection."212 As Staughton Lynd has described it, the right guar-
anteed in section 7 is a "translation into law of the labor movement
concept of `solidarity.'" 2 " That right resonates with its communi-
tarian underpinnings.
The National Labor Relations Board originally held that an
employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement engages in
protected concerted activity whenever she exercises a right guar-
anteed by the agreement, whether she acts on her own or in con-
nection with others.214 Subsequently, the NLRB concluded that,
even in the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, the efforts
of a single worker could constitute protected activity if the worker
sought to address safety concerns that all employees might reason-
ably be expected to share.215 These NLRB rulings captured the
essence of the group right protected in section 7: one person's
enjoyment or exercise of a collective right does not subtract from
another's enjoyment or exercise of the same right. 216
In the 1980s, however, the NLRB reversed itself, ruling that a
solitary employee's action is not concerted unless it is engaged in
"with or on the authority of other employees." 217 The Board rea-
soned that the NLRA requires "some linkage to group action" in
order for an individual employee's activity to be deemed "con-
in the shape of a new social movement. Id, at 336-37. We must, Morone suggests, search for
a more workable form of popular participation that will "marr[y] democratic wishes to
contemporary institutions." Id. at 335-36.
212 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988).
213 Lynd, supra note 19, at 494; see also Richard M. Fischl, Self, Others, and Section 7:
Mutualinn and Protected Protest Activities Under the National Labor Relations Art, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 789, 850-51 (1989) (elaborating on the origin of section 7's "mutual aid or protection"
language in the labor movement and its ethos of class-based solidarity).
214 See Interboro Contractors, Inc., 157 N.L.R.B. 1295, 1301-02 (1966) (holding that
complaints concerning working conditions covered by the collective bargaining agreement
were protected activity).
213 See Alleluia Cushion Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 999 (1975) (solitary employee's complaints
about safety conditions in workplace, where no collective agreement was in effect, were
protected activity).
213 See DENNIS CHONG, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 2-4 (1991)
(goals such as civil rights, women's rights and peace are public goods, and the benefits of
these goods are not susceptible to "crowding").
212 Meyers Indus., Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 493, 497 (1984) (Meyers I).
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certed." 218 The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Board's
interpretation of the NLRA;" 9 the Second Circuit has concurred. 22°
The NLRA's statutory right to engage in collective action,
unique in our jurisprudence, is central to the essence of what labor
unions are, or could be, about. I join Staughton Lynd in suggesting
that this right should serve as a building block in a new movement
to restore "from below" the vigor of the labor movement. 2" The
right to engage in collective action is a clear reflection of Morone's
"democratic wish," although it remains dormant as a result of union
complacency, powerlessness, and the NLRA interpretations that
have undermined its efficacy. An infusion of new ideas, strategies
and goals is required to resuscitate it, lest the labor movement sink
further into stagnation. 222
III. CRITIQUES OF THE NLRA AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Labor scholars have mounted numerous critiques of the labor
laws, the system of collective bargaining and labor unions them-
selves. 225 The vast majority of these critiques either accept the fun-
damental premises and values of the adversarial system—hierarchy,
competition and linear, bi-polar thinking—or they proceed from an
individualistic, rights-based approach that necessarily entails privi-
leging the rights of one individual or group "over" those of another,
which is a more subtle form of hierarch y. 224 Thus, both lines of
analysis revolve around a partriarchal conception of power as one
individual's ability to control another. 225 Neither critique is predi-
nn Meyers Indus., Inc., 281 N.L.R.B. 882, 883-84 (1986) (Meyers 11) (on remand from
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which had required further explication of the Board's
reasoning and its basis in the NLRA, in Prill v. NLRB, 755 F.2d 941, 956-57 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985)).
2 ' 9 Prill v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481, 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
nu See Ewing v. NLRB, 861'F.2d 353, 361 (2d Cir. 1988).
221 See Lynd, supra note 19, at 494-95; see also Staughton Lynd & Alice Lynd, Labor in
the Era of Multinatianalism: The Crisis in Bargained-Far Fringe Benefits, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 907,
912, 944 (1991) (advocating a "rebuilding of the labor movement from below by grassroots
direct action," "in the spirit of an injury to one is an injury to all'").
212 See CHONG, supra note 216, at 197.
"9 See supra note 13 and sources cited therein.
1" The sole exception is the communitarian critique articulated by Staughton Lynd. See
supra notes 19, 180, 213 and accompanying text, and works of Staughton Lynd cited therein.
229 Indeed, both theories can be conceptualized as dealing with an individual's or group's
entitlement to property or resources over and against another's entitlement. See Lynd, supra
note 19, at 494.
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cated on the feminist conception of power described in
Section II.A.226
A. The Adversarial Theory
Adversarialists picture the interests of labor and management
as inherently conflicting, and either support collective bargaining
as an appropriate mechanism for channeling that conflict, or criti-
cize it for masking and defusing workers' power. In either event,
they view labor-management relations as a struggle for control: over
the production process, over working conditions, and ultimately,
over distribution of the profits. 227
Adversarialists who defend the collective bargaining system as
a proper channeling of the inevitable conflict between employers
and employees typically propose incremental reforms in the labor
laws.228
 Paul Weiler is a well-known incrementalist. He articulates
coherent proposals for repair of existing labor laws that are none-
theless loyal to the adversarial underpinnings of the NLRA. 229 Clyde
226 See supra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
227 See, e.g., Barbara Reisman & Lance Compa, The Case for Adversarial Unions, HARV.
Bus. REV., May-june 1985, at 22, 30 (healthy conflict is organic to capitalist system).
226 See Millspaugh, supra note 13, at 697-98 (incrementalists do not challenge funda-
mental assumptions of existing regime. preferring to focus on adjustments to existing struc-
ture). Some adversarialists, of course, do not propose any changes at all. See, e.g., Collective
Bargaining as an Industrial System, supra note 121, at 1680 (defending adversarial model of
labor relations because it confines industrial strife within "relatively stable bounds," and
advocating strict judicial construction of section 8(a)(2) to promote necessary separation
between employer and workers). The author of the above-cited work worries that even
incremental reforms may undermine the adversarial nature of the Act. See id. at 1682 ("The
courts that have attempted to reinterpret section 8(a)(2) [to permit cooperative employee
representation plans] have failed to recognize that pulling this single thread may ultimately
threaten the entire fabric of the Act.").
229 See Fried, supra note I I, at 1017-18. Fried cites and briefly discusses two of Weiler's
works: Promises To Keep, supra note 13 (suggesting reform modeled on Canadian labor law
to allow union certifications based upon authorization card counts), and Striking a New Balance,
supra note 13 (proposing compulsory arbitration over deadlocks in first union contracts,
reversal of the Mackay Radio rule allowing permanent replacement of strikers, relaxed rules
against secondary boycotts, and firmer union controls over workers through increased power
to discipline members). Id.
In his most recent work, Weiler continues to defend the collective bargaining system,
attributing unions' decline primarily to two factors: increased employer opposition and
cumbersome legal procedures blocking unionization. See WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORK-
PLACE, supra note 13, at 108-18. Although Weiler also makes brief reference to changes in
popular attitudes toward unions, and calls for the union movement itself to "refurbish its
own structure, platform, and image," he apparently sees union structure and image as a
problem only with respect to the "new breed" of worker (white-collar, technical, administrative
and professional employees) to whom the traditional union is unappealing. Id. at 106-08.
As one commentator has noted, Weiler's focus on employer anti-union efforts and legal
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Summers, another prominent incrementalist, advocates shoring up
the collective bargaining system in unionized workplaces, and ex-
tending it to cover non-unionized employees. 230
Other adversarialists, sometimes contradictorily referred to as
"cooperationists," are critical of the collective bargaining system
because it promotes confrontational behavior on the part of
unions."' They too subscribe to the underlying assumption that a
struggle for control between employers and workers is inevitable;
their position is that openly confrontational strategies promote un-
necessary hostility between management and labor, ultimately lead-
ing to inefficiency, 232 Cooperationists strive to make the inevitable
struggle between labor and management "kinder and gentler" by
obstacles to unionization prevents him from examining more closely unions' failure to adapt
to changing workplace realities. See Samuel Issacharoff, Reconstructing Employment, 104 HARV,
L. REV. 607, 630 (1990) (book review). Ultimately, Weiler concedes that incremental labor
law reform may be insufficient to accomplish the broader goal of an independent employee
voice in the corporate system, but remains optimistic about the potential of the combined
effects of social and institutional changes and serious statutory reform. See WEILER, GOVERN-
ING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 275-79.
25° See Summers, supra note 13, 19-34.
231 By "cooperationists," I refer to those who advocate new forms of cooperative ventures
in which "management forms a long-term partnership with labor and engages labor's input
in the early stages of planning, decision-making, and development," but that leaves the
ultimate decision making power with management. See Lori M. Beranek, Comment, The
Saturnization of American Plants: Infringement or Expansion of Workers' Rights?, 72 MINN. L. REV.
173, 179 (1987). See also infra note 234 and accompanying text.
232 Adversarialists and cooperationists are often portrayed in the industrial relations
literature as having antithetical positions. The adversarial versus cooperation debate usually
takes the form of disagreement over the interpretation of section 8(a)(2). See supra note 121
and accompanying text. Many commentators have assumed that the adversarial and coop-
erative models are distinct, alternative and fundamentally incompatible. See Clarke, supra
note 92, at 2021, 2023 (describing the cooperative model as "diametrically opposed" to the
adversarial model, and proposing that workers be offered the choice between adversarial or
cooperative representation); Kohler, supra note 121, at 499-500, 513, 517-18. As others have
pointed out, however, the polarization between the two positions is exaggerated, and reforms
that blend the two are possible. See, e.g., Klare, supra note 184, at 51, 60 ("[P]roductive
cooperation requires the existence of autonomous, collective organization of workers, a central
feature of adversarialism."); Lipsky, supra note 129, at 669-70 ("The adversarial model, based
on scientific management theories, and the cooperative model, based on humanistic theories,
are not mutually exclusive.").
In short, the adversarial and cooperative models, rather than being antithetical, are
correspondent. Differences between them are superficial. Adversarialists posit "pure con-
flict."—that the interests of labor and management are irreconcilable, and therefore favor
direct confrontation. Cooperationists purport to ignore the conflicts and argue that "pure
consensus" exists—that the interests of labor and management in such matters as efficiency
and productivity are identical. See Joel Cutcher-Gershenfeld, The Impact on Economic Perfor-
mance of a Transformation in Workplace Relations, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 241, 242 ti.1
(1991). A few, more sophisticated commentators acknowledge the simultaneous possibility of
a conflict and a convergence of interests. See Klare, supra note 184, at 62.
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proposing modifications to, or broader interpretations of, NLRA
section 8(a)(2) in order to pave the way for cooperative ventures. 233
Many cooperationists assume that the employer is entitled to control
the workplace as a matter of right; participatory methods are uti-
lized to make this reality more palatable for employees. 234 Other
cooperationists simply value profitability, and the ability to compete
internationally, more highly than the minimal additive value of the
opportunity to express their hostility at the bargaining table. 235
2" See, e.g., David H. Brody, Note, The Future of Labor-Management Cooperative Efforts
Under Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 41 VAND. L. REV. 545, 574 (1988)
(arguing for relaxed judicial interpretation of section 8(a)(2) that would permit cooperative
employee committees that promote employee free choice); Clarke, supra note 92, at 2022,
2023 (proposing congressional repeal or modification of section 8(a)(2) to facilitate cooper-
ative representation and worker participation plans, while harnessing section 8(a)( I) as a
vehicle to prevent employer domination or coercion); Lipsky, supra note 129, at 670, 716-
19 (1990) (proposing legislative and judicial changes to accommodate two-tiered "cooperative"
structure with labor representatives on board of directors, with traditional adversarial rela-
tionship during bargaining at the board of director level, and cooperative, yet organized
structure on the shop floor).
234 See Kohler, supra note 121, at 547 (cooperative model is merely subtle tool for
management subjugation of worker self-determination; participatory associations are "more
manipulative than democratic in intent"); Sar A. Levitan & Clifford M. Johnson, Labor and
Management: The Illusion of Cooperation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1983, at 8 (in its present
form, participative management is a placebo that "gives workers the trappings of decision-
making power"); Collective Bargaining as an Industrial System, supra note 121, at 1662 n.2 (many
union supporters "consider even 'benign' employee representation plans a management
device to undermine union solidarity").
In effect, then, many forms of participative management only seek to sugarcoat the gap
between the interests of labor and management with goodwill and improved communication,
See Levitan & Johnson, supra, at 7. Indeed, some participative management schemes are
inherently inconsistent with the spirit of genuine cooperation because management retains
the ultimate control, exercising its power to ignore labor's demands when they conflict with
profit-maximization goals. Id, at 9. Genuine cooperation would require that labor contribute
not only to the solution of problems, but also to their perception and definition. Id. at 16.
Karl Klare expresses the weaknesses of the pure cooperative model most succinctly, suggest-
ing that it is characterized by "an overly exclusive focus on efficiency at the expense of the
other dimensions of the employment relationship; overemphasis on attitudes, which prevents
the cooperationists from seeing the historical basis of adversarialism; and failure to take
account of the true structure of power within the firm." Klare, supra note 184, at 61.
235 See, e.g., BUREAU OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS,
supra note 120, at 141 (describing review of labor laws conducted by Department of Labor
to determine whether labor laws impede efforts at labor-management cooperation; Depart-
ment believes such cooperation is necessary for America to return to predominance in the
world market); Klare, supra note 184, at 58-60 (describing call for cooperative approach to
industrial relations as stressing cessation of hostilities in order to increase productivity and
competitiveness of the firm; goal is to achieve voluntary alignment of the individual worker's
loyalties with the objectives of the firm, as ultimately defined by management).
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B. Individual Rights Theorists
Individual rights theorists also assume an inevitable conflict of
interest between management and labor, but approach the issue on
an individual level rather than on a group or class-based level. These
theorists argue for radical, innovative reform that purports to give
maximum rein to individual employees in realizing their interests.
The conservative line of critical attack is led by Richard Epstein,
who advocates deregulation and proposes that the NLRA be re-
placed by a common law regime based on tort and contract law. 238
Another prominent conservative, Charles Fried, proposes replacing
collective bargaining with improved legislation setting minimal
terms of employment, thus specifically conferring rights on individ-
ual employees. 2"
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, but nevertheless
equally concerned with individual employee rights, are the Critical
Legal Studies scholars. These academics oppose deregulation and
privatization because such reforms effectively reinforce pre-existing
disparities in power between management and labor. 238 Although
supportive of unionism and collective bargaining as tools to further
workplace democracy, Critical Legal Studies proponents are trou-
bled by the lack of efficacy of these tools in the context of the
existing legal and social structure.239 Nevertheless, such scholars
share the assumption that the interests of labor and capital conflict,
and believe that a rights-based system offers the best form of pro-
tection in a society where power between capital and labor is un-
balanced. Accordingly, Critical Legal Studies writers propose re-
forms, based on direct governmental intervention guaranteeing
individual rights to employees and substantive protections to unions
238 See Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations, supra note 11. See generally Epstein, In
Defense of the Contract at Will, supra note 11 (defending contract of employment at will, arguing
that evolving doctrine of wrongful discharge undermines basic individual liberty of contract).
237 See Fried, supra note 11, at 1036-37.
238 See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Future of Collective Bargaining: A Review Essay,
58 U. Cm L. REV. 477,487 (1989) (book review).
232 Karl Klare summarizes the common themes running through the work of Critical
Legal Studies advocates, as follows:
First, we argue that collective bargaining law articulates an ideology that aims
to legitimate and justify unnecessary and destructive hierarchy and domination
in the workplace. The second theme is that collective bargaining law has evolved
an institutional architecture, a set of managerial and legal arrangements, that
reinforces this hierarchy and domination.
Klare, Labor Law as Ideology, supra note 13, at 452.
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under labor law, that are designed to alter the power imbalance
between employees and employers. 240
In the next section, I articulate a "re-vision" of labor law that
is predicated upon a feminist conception of power. Because I begin
with the assumption that the process of empowerment is as impor-
tant as the immediate substantive outcome, I reject reforms accom-
plished solely through government intervention. My concern is not
only with correcting the imbalance of power, but with defining and
building a new form of power.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE VISION
In a companion article, I argue that unions must forge a soli-
darity that stretches across class, gender and race boundaries to re-
radicalize the labor movement. 24 ' In that article, as in this one, I
suggest that a labor movement allied with the feminist movement
and organized around a feminist conception of power would bring
new vitality to unions as they struggle to empower workers, partic-
ularly women. 242
 The other piece of the program for this revitali-
zation is explored in this section: the labor laws must be altered to
foster a new understanding of the exercise and allocation of power
between labor and capital.
The feminist vision of power outlined above suggests different,
and more radical, transformative possibilities for legal reform. The
intervention strategies suggested by those who subscribe to a pa-
triarchal understanding of power are based upon a paternalistic
model, in which protectionist strategies are employed in aid of the
disempowered group, labor. In this model, labor continues to be
240 See, e.g., Klare, Workplace Democracy & Market Reconstruction, supra note 13, at 3, 13
(proposing market reconstruction at the governmental level in support of collective bargain-
ing); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and
Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 73, 152-61 (1988) (arguing that the law should be
modified to give labor access to conventional levers of power, including representation on
corporate boards and expanded rights to deal with corporate creditors, so that labor can
pursue its interests in competition with the other constituencies of the corporation).
241 See Crain, supra note 23, at 113-15. A simultaneous challenge to class, gender and
race barriers is likely to be even more powerful than the sum of its parts. A community
cannot be dealt with apart from its context, and class is not the only linkage, or even the
most important linkage, among workers in a particular community. Suzanne Goldberg, In
Pursuit of Workplace Rights: Household Workers and a Conflict of Laws, 3 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
63, 102 (1991). My focus here is on gender, a context that has historically been overlooked
by the labor movement. See Crain, supra note 5, at 1159-84.
"2 See Crain, supra note 23, at 115. Some express hope that the feminization of unions
will initiate a new "social unionism" reminiscent of the radical, communitarian union spirit
that pervaded the 1930s. See, e.g., Bum, supra note 5, at 11.
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overpowered or controlled, but it is the government rather than
the employer that exercises control. By contrast, a model of inter-
vention based on a feminist vision of power utilizes power-balancing
strategies that facilitate the disempowered party's efforts to em-
power itself. 243 The feminist model is preferable because it enhances
opportunities for autonomy, dignity, choice and decisionmaking,
rather than simply substituting the court's power for that of the
unempowered party, and because it is fairer, in a distributive
sense. 244
In this section, I outline the foundation of a feminist program
for the feminization of the labor laws. 245 I describe a system in
which ( 1) rights of individual workers are expanded but also are
collective in nature; (2) workers could join together in decentralized
"unions" only vaguely resembling those with which we are now
familiar; (3) such unions would reject the narrow goal of commercial
empowerment for workers in favor of a broader goal of economic,
social and political empowerment; (4) participatory democracy
would be the norm rather than the exception; (5) decisions would
be made by persuasion and consensus rather than majoritarian vote;
and (6) unions would deal with the employer in a coordinated
fashion on all subjects that concern capital and labor, cooperating
where possible to avoid conflict and confronting conflicts where
they do exist.
Because the labor laws are explicitly designed to strike a balance
of power between labor and capital, I begin with the deconstruction
of the patriarchal concept of power that lies behind the labor laws.
In general, I suggest abandoning the rigid, adversarial, "win-lose"
mindset underlying the labor laws, in favor of a more flexible,
cooperative, "win-win" philosophy. At the heart of my argument is
an assumption that the interests of labor and capital are not always,
2° Bender, supra note 4, at 892-93. Leslie Bender has made a similar argument in the
context of protecting plaintiffs in tort law. See id. at 890-91. In Feminist Re (Torts), Bender
advocates that courts adopt a feminist strategy of power-balancing (through burden-shifting
rules, rebuttable presumptions concerning liability, and immediacy of remedy) that would
empower plaintiffs in mass tort cases who face corporate defendants with greater resources,
knowledge and access to information. Id, at 893-94. Bender refers to this Feminist modality
of power as "'empowering or power-balancing," and contrasts it with a masculine modality
of power, which she terms "'overpowering or controlling/protecting.'" See id. at 892; see also
Leslie Bender, Changing the Values in Tort Law, 25 TULSA L.J. 759, 762-63 (1990) (synthesis
of same arguments).
244 Id. at 890-91.
245 This proposal builds on the general outlines I suggested for the feminization of labor
law in a previous work. See Crain, supra note 5, at 1214-19.
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inevitably, in conflict. Thus, it is simultaneously possible for them
to share some common goals and to clash over others, or to agree
on goals but disagree on the means of achieving them. My argument
also assumes that the relationship between labor and capital is far
more complex than the simplistic adversarial cast it has acquired
through tradition and law. In short, I suggest that the law should
reflect the reality that the relationship between employer and em-
ployees, like any continuing relation, is multi-faceted and entails
both conflict and cooperation.
My paradigm of a reconstituted labor law overlaps with some
of the suggestions made by others; however, it differs in significant
ways because of my focus on eliminating the patriarchal norms of
power and power allocation, which are encoded as republicanism
in the labor laws. The proposal that is most compatible with a
feminist re-visioning is that advanced by Charles Heckscher.
Heckscher is critical of the "balance of power" ideology that per-
meates labor law. He contends that the balance created by establish-
ing two parallel adversaries is rigid, slow to adapt, and ill-suited for
dealing with diversity among workers. 246 Heckscher advocates in its
place a more flexible form of unionism, "associational unionism." 247
A key feature of associational unionism is its tolerance for
multiple forms of worker representation that would coordinate di-
versity within unions, thereby capitalizing on workers' ties with
other social movements, such as the women's movement. 248 Another
characteristic of associational unionism that is consistent with a fem-
inist model is its mechanism for resolution of disputes, which in-
cludes extended negotiation, direct participation, deliberate clarifi-
cation of values and interests, and aspirations toward consensus-
building.249
Nevertheless, Heckscher's proposal places the burden solely on
unions to transform themselves; he makes no concrete suggestions
as to how the law ought to be modified in order to accommodate
associational unionism. This is of particular concern because, as he
acknowledges, the energy for change is centered in groups located
outside the traditional labor relations system. 25° Many of these
groups, such as Blacks and women, already shoulder the additional
246 HECKSCHER, supra note 8, at 7.
2" See id. at 8.
242 Id. at 177,189-90.
249 Id, at 193-94.
260 Id, at 191,256.
May 1992]	 IMAGES OF POWER	 529
burden of fighting oppression based on gender and/or race. Thus,
Heckscher's system would place the responsibility for initiating
change on these groups, rather than shifting the onus onto unions
to mobilize for change through institutional restructuring.
James Pope has offered a more concrete suggestion in support
of associational unionism. 251. Because the law has traditionally main-
tained a rigid division between labor activities (covered by the
NLRA) and community protests (for which First Amendment pro-
tection is available), Pope urges a reexamination of the law to ac-
commodate labor-community boycotts. 252 He believes that labor-
community boycotts could provide a source of economic power for.
unions because such boycotts are a vehicle for unions to engage
allies from other social movements, such as the women's and the
civil rights movements, to put pressure on employers. 253 He envi-
sions these boycotts as a practical "testing ground" for the viability
of Heckscher's associational unionism. 254 Nevertheless, rather than
proposing change in the labor laws or directly challenging the ar-
tificial dichotomy in the law's treatment of industrial and community
activism, Pope advocates classifying labor-community boycotts in the
political sphere, and according them expanded First Amendment
protection because they are more political and less coercive in na-
ture than traditionaLlabor boycotts. 255
Paul Weiler has articulated some useful arguments for a femi-
nist reconstructive reform of the labor laws. Weiler accepts the
balance of power ideology and adversarial assumptions behind the
law, and proposes legal reforms designed to shift the balance of
power toward labor's side of the equation. 256 Although Weiler does
251 James G. Pope, Labor-Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New
Unionism, and the Living Constitution, 69 Tax. L. REV. 889 (1991).
452
	 at 897.
255 Id. at 912-13. Pope points out that both movements boast networks of experienced,
committed activists that could be effective in conducting boycotts and in appealing to workers
to join unions. Id.
Id. at 913.
255 Id. at 919-20, 973; cf. James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First Amendment
Values: Two Rungs and a Black Role, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 189 (1984) (describing artificial
dichotomy in First Amendment law and arguing for expanded First Amendment protection
for labor speech).
256 See WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 275 (arguing for redesign
of representation process and process by which unions negotiate first contracts). Weiler refers
to this type of labor law reform as "reconstructive," in the sense that the changes proposed
would "reconstruct" the background labor law, and contrasts it with a regulatory model,
which, in his view, entails excessive reliance on external NLRB or judicial regulation. Id. at
253. The reconstructive model is superior because it enlists the workers themselves in the
struggle to gain fundamental rights. Id.
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not mount a challenge to the definition of power itself, some of his
proposed reforms have the potential to modify the culture of the
union and the way in which it exercises power. For example, his
proposals with regard to restructuring first contract negotiations 257
and providing recognition through card counts rather than resort-
ing to elections 258
 are consistent with a feminist modality of empow-
erment. These proposals could establish conditions facilitating mo-
bilization, while leaving the process of empowerment in the hands
of the workers.
On the other hand, Weiler has also suggested a "constitutive"
model of change, in which government legislation would guarantee
all employees access to a basic level of participation in a specified
range of workplace decisions. 259 I disagree with this approach be-
cause it reinforces patriarchal power and disregards the significance
of the organizing process itself. Moreover, Weiler's approach de-
values the process of establishing and nurturing relationships, build-
ing a community, and developing a collective rapport. These aspects
of the organizing process are central to the empowerment pro-
cess. 26°
A. Eliminating the Adversarial Premise
In order to alter the understanding of power in the labor laws
at the most fundamental level, I begin with the cornerstones of the
adversarial labor law system: the definition of an employee (NLRA
section 2(3)), the definition of a labor organization and its relation-
ship to the employer (NLRA sections 2(5) and 8(a)(2)), and the
exclusivity provisions limiting employee voice (NLRA section 9(a)).
These are the constitutive aspects of labor law, and they are the
places in the law where the line-drawing that reinforces the adver-
sarial system is anchored. All are predicated on a conception of
power as domination and control, and its exercise as creating a
hierarchical relation.
257 See Weiler, Striking A New Balance, supra note 13, at 405-12; see also, Weiler, Promises
to Keep, supra note 13, at 1805.
256 See Weiler, Promises to Keep, supra note 13, at 1805.
259 WEILER, GOVERNING TIIE WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 282. Weiler proposes adoption
of Employee Participation Committees ("EPC's"), modeled on the West German Works Coun-
cil. Id, at 284. In such a system, the Works Council deals directly with management within
the individual enterprise about the application' of industry-wide standards contained in
umbrella agreements negotiated by unions. See id. at 293-94. In Weiler's vision, EPC's would
serve as a safety net for the vast majority of unorganized, unrepresented employees, and
could coexist with unions to reinforce worker rights. Id. at 282-95.
"° See Crain, supra note 23, at 89-96.
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I have argued elsewhere that the NLRA's definition of em-
ployee should be modified to encompass the entire laboring class. 26 '
My explicit premise was that there exists no natural, inevitable "line"
between management and labor, or insurmountable conflict of in-
terest for managers who simultaneously seek to protect their own
interests while serving those of the employer. 262 Accordingly, section
2(5) would be modified to include organizations of "employees," as
newly defined in section 2(3). These changes would result in the
broadest possible definitions of employees and labor organizations,
enhancing the potential for worker solidarity and bringing as many
workers and worker organizations as possible under the umbrella
of the NLRA.
Section 8(a)(2), prohibiting employers from dominating, inter-
fering with or assisting the formation or administration of a labor
organization, should be repealed. It reinforces the "line" between
employer and employees, and essentially further divides them by
blocking efforts at cooperation. Moreover, section 8(a)(2) incorpo-
rates a paternalistic assumption that labor unions will not be capable
of remaining loyal to their members if subjected to pressure and/
or temptation from the employer. While the repeal of this section
might be of some concern in the context of a dichotomy between
employees and managers, and a system of exclusive union repre-
sentation that encourages entrenched, centralized power, it should
not present a danger to workers in a modified environment of
broader NLRA coverage and non-exclusive representation.
Repeal of section 9(a)'s principle of exclusive representation is
essential to a feminist reform of the labor laws. The "tight solidarity
of collective action" is neither feasible nor desirable in a work force
as heterogeneous as the current and projected population of work-
ers. Consequently, unions must forego the security of exclusive
representation in order to accommodate multiple, overlapping com-
munities of workers within the same workplace unit. 26" The prin-
261 See Crain, supra note 92, at 1015-20 (proposing amendment to delete exclusion of
supervisors, managerial employees and confidential employees from NLRA coverage).
262 See id. at 983-92.
263 See ElEcKscHER, supra note 8, at 183; see also Craver, supra note 13, at 655 (noting
tension between the increasing heterogeneity of the work force and the section 9(a) exclusivity
provision, and suggesting either repeal of section 9(a) or modification to provide a limited
veto power for minorities, overridable only by a weighted majority); George Schatzki, Majority
Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests of Individual Workers: Should Exclusivity Be Abol-
ished', 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 938 (1975) (suggesting that abolition of exclusivity rule,
particularly in light of the context of a Board unit determination process that neglects
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ciple of majoritarian representation does not adequately safeguard
the interests of women and minorities, given their history of exclu-
sion from, and continuing lack of power in, labor unions. A system
of coordinated diversity will contribute to a decentralized union
structure and help to ensure participatory democracy rather than
the re-creation, in union structure, of the hierarchical, exclusionary
structure of capital. Repeal of section 9(a) will require correspond-
ing changes in the duty of fair representation doctrine, a requisite
corollary to the exclusivity doctrine under existing law. 264 The duty
of fair representation, if it continued to exist at all, would likely
evolve into an equal protection model of representation. 265
B. Additional Reforms
Although it will not be clear exactly what further reforms are
needed to conform labor law to the new unionism until these fun-
damental changes have been made and we gain some experience
with this new unionism, I outline below some reforms that appear
necessary in light of the experience of a few feminized unions.
Although many of the doctrines or provisions discussed below ap-
pear to reflect neutral values, their interaction with the disparate
economic power of capital and the current nature of male-domi-
nated unions produces a decided "tilt" against a new form of union
that includes previously marginalized workers, particularly
women.266
1. Organizing
It is obvious that unions require increased access to workers in
order to organize them. The existing doctrine governing union
access to employees for organizational purposes gives exaggerated
weight to the employer's interests in maintaining control over its
property, blocking effective union access to the vast majority of
employees' community of interest, would democratize unions, make them more responsive
to members' concerns, and relieve the Board of its election responsibilities).
2" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
2" See Michael C. Harper & Ira C. Lupu, Fair Representation As Equal Protection, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1211, 1216-17 (1985) (arguing that politically weak or unpopular minorities can be
protected in democratic unions through application of a coherent theory of equal protection
as the model for the duty of fair representation).
266 See WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 228; see also Bender, supra
note 4, at 884-85 (exploring concept of "equality-before-the-law: . which ignores the realities
of power differences and employs "neutral" rules that are "blind" (like justice) to these power
imbalances).
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employees.267 It is no accident that initial success with clerical work-
ers has been achieved in the university setting; the distinctive open-
ness of the academy for employees and outside organizers has been
a significant factor in the ability of union organizers to reach women
workers, who often find it difficult to attend after-work meetings
because of their double burden of child care and domestic respon-
sibilities. 268
Paul Weiler's suggestion that we abandon the election system
in favor of instant recognition based on a super-majority card count
would be helpful here. 269 The current election system is consistent
with an adversary system based upon an individualistic ethic of
justice. The system assumes that those who did not wish to be
represented by a union will be content to live with one because the
election process was fair. 2" This misconstrues the goal of unionism:
an association of workers who are bound together by a perception
of common interest and a feeling of community, rather than by the
application of legal principles of majoritarian rule. A system of
instant recognition based upon a super-majority card count, in com-
bination with abolition of the exclusive representation principle,
would be more consistent with a feminist method of empowerment
and participatory democracy, which relies on consensus as the
source of group power and cohesiveness. Under this system, non-
signers would be free to change their minds and join the recognized
group following recognition, or to form a separate organization, or
to form none at all. In this way, the incentive for the organizer to
267 The doctrine respecting access by outside union organizers accords undue deference
to the employer's rights to control its physical property, and to protect it against trespass. See
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB; 112 S. Ct. 841 (1992) and NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox, 351 U.S.
105 (1956), discussed supra note 103. The law governing solicitation by employees on com-
pany property permits undue employer control over workers' labor—viewed by the Court as
another form of company "property"—through no-solicitation rules. See Republic Aviation
v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945), discussed supra note 103.
268 See Craig Becker, Unions on Campus: Lessons of the Harvard Drive, THE NATION, Feb.
12, 1990, at 196.
"9 See WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 13, at 253-61. Some unions
have successfully utilized an 8(b)(7) strategy to obtain an expedited election, which accom-
plishes the goal of avoiding a lengthy campaign period while simultaneously exerting eco-
nomic pressure. Once the union has enough signed authorization cards to suggest likely
success in an election, it demands recognition, and when the employer refuses, the union
establishes a picket with non-employees, and instructs employees to continue working. Within
thirty days of the commencement of the picketing, the union files a petition for an election,
validating the continuation of the picketing under § 8(b)(7)(C). See Bernard L. Samoff, What
Lies Ahead for the NLRB?, 38 LAII. L.J. 259, 266-67 (1987).
278 See Robin Leidner, Stretching the Boundaries of Liberalism: Democratic Innovation in a
Feminist Organization, 16 SIGNS 263, 283 (1991).
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build a large community remains intact, but the inevitable dissidents
do not remain to dilute the union's power by undermining solidar-
ity.
2. Bargaining
Two areas of reform are immediately apparent in the process
of bargaining. First, as multilateral negotiation techniques are de-
veloped in order to accommodate bargaining between multiple par-
ties, the dynamics of bargaining will change. 27 ' Concepts such as
the duty to bargain "in good faith" must evolve in order to be
meaningful in a multi-party situation. Bargaining "to impasse," for
example, which normally means negotiating until the parties' posi-
tions become fixed and a stalemate occurs, 272 would take on an
entirely different meaning because multiple parties would be much
less likely to polarize. Because bargaining to impasse is the prereq-
uisite to the employer's ability to implement unilateral changes in
working conditions (mandatory subjects), 273 it has been a vital tool
in determining the extent of employee participation in workplace
governance.
Second, the implicit restrictions that the NLRA places on bar-
gaining, by explicitly including some subjects and implicitly exclud-
ing others (the mandatory/permissive subject dichotomy), must be
eliminated. These implicit restrictions are contained in section 2(5)
(defining labor organizations as those that deal with employers "con-
cerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment, or conditions of work"), section 8(d) (defining duty to
bargain collectively in good faith only "with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment"), and section 9(a)
(specifying that a labor organization is the exclusive representative
for the purpose of bargaining "in respect to rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment"). The
subjects limitation of the NLRA serves not only to remove some of
the most important decisions from the collective bargaining process,
but also reinforces prevailing patterns of power in industrial life
'1 ' See HECKSCHER, supra note 8, at 200 (multilateral negotiation is not just a bigger form
of bilateral collective bargaining).
272 See generally David G. Epstein, Comment, impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEX. L.
Rev. 769, 777 (1966) (impasse requires (I) a deadlock in negotiations and (2) good faith
bargaining, with particular attention to factors such as use of a mediator, changes in bar-
gaining position, desire to continue negotiations and the frequency of bargaining negotia-
tions).
2" See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 741-43 (1962).
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and, ultimately, limits our imagination in rethinking issues of work-
place governance. 274
3. Concerted Activity As a Means of Economic Pressure
The collective right to engage in "concerted activities . . . for
mutual aid or protection" afforded employees by section 7 of the
NLRA is at the heart of the NLRA's communitarian basis. This
right is an attempt to codify the experience of solidarity, and should
be construed as broadly as possible. A' broad construction of the
"concert" requirement would recognize the industrial reality that
the action of an individual worker is experienced by other workers
as one in which they have a long-term stake. 275
 A broad construction
of the "mutual aid or protection" requirement would pave the way
for innovative strategies of collective economic resistance. 276
CONCLUSION
Labor law and labor unionism are at a crossroads. Pressure
from employers and from competition with foreign businesses has
ensured that "[t]he labor movement does not have the luxury of
continuing with business as usual, even if it could somehow induce
its disillusioned membership to do so."277 I suggest that organized
labor must build a new form of solidarity that is not solely class-
based, but is instead forged in the common experience of oppres-
sion across race, gender and class. Feminist visions and practices of
power, exercised within communitarian structures of power allo-
cation, provide a hospitable environment for constructing the
274 See Note, Subjects of Bargaining Under the NLRA and the Limits of Liberal Political
Imagination, 97 WARY. L. REV. 475, 479 (1983).
275 See Staughton Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 TEX. L. Rtv. 1417, 1426 (1984); see also
Robert A. Gorman and Matthew W. Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert"
under the National Labor Relations Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286, 329 (1981) (calling for broad
reading of concert requirement in section 7); B. Glenn George, Divided We Stand: Concerted
Activity and the Maturing of the NLRA, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 509, 511 (1988) (same). But cf.
Cynthia L. Estlund, What Do Workers Want? Employee Interests, Public Interests, and Freedom of
Expression Under the National Labor Relations Act, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 921, 942, 967 (1992)
(arguing for interpretation of section 7 that would protect the rights of employees to com-
municate and protest about matters beyond the terms and conditions of their employment;
under this proposal, the concert requirement would remain intact, but determination of
appropriate subjects of employee concern would be left to employees).
255 See Estlund, supra note 275, at 967; Pope, supra note 251, at 912-13; Crain, supra
note 23, at 107-13.
Lynd & Lynd, supra note 221, at 944.
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bridge of empathy that must serve as the connecting and stabilizing
element in this new solidarity.
In a previous article, I articulated a feminist strategy for em-
powerment that unions might adopt in organizing, bargaining and
exerting economic pressure. 278 A critical factor in its success, how-
ever, is a legal environment that facilitates, or at least is not hostile
to, such routes to empowerment. 279 In this article, I have sketched
the outlines of a labor law framework that would facilitate the
feminization and re-radicalization of labor unions. In particular, I
have argued that the current republican system of allocation, with
its overlay of representation and exclusivity predicated on both
internal and external union hierarchies, reinforces and perpetuates
the internal division and factionalization of the labor movement. In
its place, I propose the adoption of a communitarian structure,
wherein multiple and overlapping communities of workers can co-
operate with one another in the process of direct action empower-
ment.
Such a "re-visioning" of labor law will require major structural
changes in the present labor laws. This is not unique to a feminist
approach; in the context of the current labor crisis, most scholars
agree that fundamental change is necessary. 28° What is unique about
the feminist strategy I have advanced is that it proposes transfor-
mation, rather than reform; it questions fundamental, underlying
assumptions about the nature of power and its exercise as reflected
in our labor laws and, ultimately, in our larger political democracy.
Grounded in concrete, grassroots activism, it proposes that working
people "shatter the self-reflecting world which encircles [them] and
. . . project [their] own image onto history" by re-visioning their
own power in a revolutionary way. 28 '
Perhaps what is most needed in the labor movement is a com-
bination of revolutionary vision, anger and strength of heart. The
working class movement, after all, is a social movement; its ends—
political, economic and social empowerment—are far broader than
the narrow "business" unionism, with its singular focus on obtaining
marginal economic gains, that is commonplace in labor unions to-
day. Unions must inspire workers by appealing to more than their
2" See Crain, supra note 23.
"2 See CHONG, supra note 216, at 173-79 (noting that a sympathetic government or one
that is perceived as responsive will encourage collective action).
28° See, e.g., sources cited supra note 13.
2" See MACKINNON, supra note 158, at 84.
May 1992]	 IMAGES OF POWER	 537
economic rationality. Instead, an appeal must be made to their
emotional, affective side, and workers must be persuaded to un-
dertake the difficult task of empowering themselves from the inside
out.282 The concept is eloquently expressed in this excerpt from a
poem by Donna Kate Rushin, written for women of color: 288
[B]reathe
Before you suffocate




The bridge I must be





I must be the bridge to nowhere
But my true self
And then
I will be useful
282 See Alan Hyde, Endangered Species, 91 CoLum. L. REV. 456, 471 (1991) (reviewing
WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 13). Hyde points out that unions cannot
survive or flourish if they limit themselves to economic appeals, because rational workers will
choose "free ridership." Id. Idealistic, visionary appeals have constructed a strong collective
identity, succeeding where more limited, rational approaches failed. Id,
28' Donna K. Rushin, The Bridge Poem, in Tuts BRIDGE, CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY
RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR at xxi, xxii (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds., paperback
ed. 1983).
